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      ABSTRACT 
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of  Wittgenstein and Searle on the 
logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point 
Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—
confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the 
same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions 
(Conditions of Satisfaction or COS)  are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything 
but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible 
in a very specific context.  I begin with ‘On Certainty’ and continue the analysis of recent 
writings by and about them from the perspective of the two systems of thought, employing a 
new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. 
 
 
“If I wanted to doubt whether this was my hand, how could I avoid doubting whether the word ‘hand’ 
has any meaning? So that is something I seem to know, after all.” Wittgenstein ‘On Certainty’ p48 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no depths have been 
plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or reconceived. How tame and 
uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, 
demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
First, let us remind ourselves of Wittgenstein’s (W) fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ 
problems (i.e., those not solved by experiments or data gathering) are the same—confusions about how 
to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can 
be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. . 
The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary 
utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. Thus W in his last masterpiece ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) looks at perspicuous examples of the varying uses of the words ‘know’, ‘doubt’ and 
‘certain’, often from his 3 typical perspectives of narrator, interlocutor and commentator, leaving the 
reader to decide the best use (clearest COS) of the sentences in each context. One can only describe the 
uses of related sentences and that’s the end of it—no hidden depths, no metaphysical insights. There 
are no ‘problems’ of ‘consciousness’, ‘will’, ‘space’, ’time’ etc., but only the need to keep the use (COS) 
of these words clear.  It is truly sad that most philosophers continue to waste their time on the linguistic 
confusions peculiar to academic philosophy rather than turning their attention to those of the other 
behavioral disciplines and to physics, biology and mathematics, where it is desperately needed.  
What has W really achieved? Here is how a leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, 
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sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic 
representation, about the relationship between thought and language, about solipsism and idealism, 
self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of 
mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He 
gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted 
to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He 
undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as a 
contribution not to human knowledge, but to human understanding – understanding of the forms of 
our thought and of the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker-- 
'Gordon Baker's late interpretation of Wittgenstein' 
To this I would add that W was the first to clearly and extensively describe the two systems of 
thought--fast automatic prelinguistic S1 and the slow reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He 
explained how behavior only is possible with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis 
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for judging and cannot be doubted or judged, so will (choice), consciousness,  self, time and space are 
innate true-only axioms. He noted in thousands of pages and hundreds of examples how our inner 
mental experiences are not describable in language, this being possible only for behavior with a public 
language (the impossibility of private language). He predicted the utility of paraconsistent logic which 
only emerged much later. Incidentally he patented helicopter designs which anticipated by three 
decades the use of blade-tip jets to drive the rotors, and which had the seeds of the centrifugal-flow 
gas turbine engine, designed a heart-beat monitor, designed and supervised the building of a 
modernist house, and sketched a proof of Euler's Theorem, subsequently completed by others. He laid 
out the psychological foundations of mathematics, logic , incompleteness, and infinity.  He can be 
viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist, since he constantly explained the necessity of the innate 
background and demonstrated how it generates behavior. Though nobody seems aware of it, he 
described the psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a fundamental measure used in 
Evolutionary Psychology (EP) decades later. He noted the indeterminate or underdetermined nature 
of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. He described and refuted the notions of 
the mind as machine and the computational theory of mind, long before practical computers or the 
famous writings of Searle. He invented truth tables for use in logic and philosophy. He decisively laid 
to rest skepticism and metaphysics. He showed that, far from being inscrutable, the activities of the 
mind lie open before us, a lesson few have learned since. 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to Cambridge Philosophy 
professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to 
Wittgenstein would be like not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of 
intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about the nature of 
reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world, and , like Einstein, nearly died in 
WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who 
published only one early version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world 
famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing more, and knowledge 
of his new work, in mostly garbled form, diffused slowly from occasional lectures and students notes; 
that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in German, 
composed of sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or 
after; that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the 
margins, underlinings and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple variants; that his 
literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving out what they wished and struggling 
with the monstrous task of capturing the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly 
novel views of how the universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing 
slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real explanation of what it 
was about; that he became as much notorious as famous due to many statements that all previous 
physics was a mistake and even nonsense, and that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of 
hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his 
early work in which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such extremely 
abstract and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was being said; that he was then 
virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of 
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modern physics had only passing and usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted him 
entirely; that to this day, over half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who 
really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the 
situation with Wittgenstein. 
Had W lived into his 80’s he would have been able to directly influence Searle (another modern genius 
of descriptive psychology), Symons, and countless other students of behavior. If his brilliant friend Frank 
Ramsey had not died in his youth, a highly fruitful collaboration would almost certainly have ensued. If 
his student and colleague Alan Turing had become his lover, one of the most amazing collaborations of 
all time would likely have evolved. In any one case the intellectual landscape of the 20th century would 
have been different and if all 3 had occurred it would almost certainly have been very different. Instead 
he lived in relative intellectual isolation, few knew him well or had an inkling of his ideas while he lived, 
and only a handful have any real grasp of his work even today. He could have shined as an engineer, a 
mathematician, a psychologist, a physiologist (he did wartime research in it), a musician (he played 
instruments and had a renowned talent for whistling), an architect (the house he designed and 
constructed for his sister still stands), or an entrepreneur (he inherited one of the largest fortunes in the 
world but gave it all away). It is a miracle he survived the trenches and prison camps and repeated 
volunteering for the most dangerous duty (while writing the Tractatus) in WW1, many years of suicidal 
depressions (3 brothers succumbed to them), avoided being trapped in Austria and executed by the 
Nazis (he was partly Jewish and probably only the Nazi’s desire to lay hands on their money saved the 
family), and that he was not persecuted for his homosexuality and driven to suicide like his friend  
Turing.  He realized nobody understood what he was doing and might never (not surprising as he was 
half a century –or a whole century depending on your point of view-ahead of psychology and 
philosophy, which only recently have started accepting that our brain is an evolved organ like our heart.) 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological 
research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see 
my reviews of TLP, PI, OC by W, and PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the Social World 
(MSW), Seeing Things As They Are (STATA), Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philsosophy (SPCP), John R 
Searle – Thinking About the Real World (TARW), and other books by and about these geniuses, who 
provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found in psychology books, that I will refer to 
as the WS framework. I begin with some penetrating quotes from W and S. 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a "young science"; its 
state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain 
branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and 
conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). The existence 
of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; 
though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask 
and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads 
the philosopher into complete darkness."(BBB p18). 
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"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because 
I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between 
true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." Wittgenstein 
Philosophical Occasions p187 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds to (is the 
translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
"Many words then in this sense then don't have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To think it is 
would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp 
boundary." BBB p27 
"Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn't be capable of interpretation. It is the 
last interpretation" BBB p34 
"There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) what would be called a 
mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a reservoir." BBB p143 
"And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is labeled by the 
word "to make" as we have used it in the sentence "It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as 
we do", because there is an idea that "something must make us" do what we do. And this again joins 
onto the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The 
chain of reasons has an end." BBB p143 
"If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, 
the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now the sentence 
itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn't the slightest similarity 
with what it represents." BBB p37 
"Thus we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are obviously not aware of the 
many different usages of the word "proof"; and that they are not clear about the differences between 
the uses of the word "kind", when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word 
"kind" here meant the same thing as in the context "kinds of apples." Or, we may say, they are not 
aware of the different meanings of the word "discovery" when in one case we talk of the discovery of 
the construction of the pentagon and in the other case of the discovery of the South Pole." BBB p29 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology 
because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness 
out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the 
phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of 
satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, 
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and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is 
a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose that every 
mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it 
is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by 
analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus." TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie 
open before us." BBB p6 
"We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life 
remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer." 
TLP 6.52 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. If your head is 
haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Z 220 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything...One might 
give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." PI 126 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our 
requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a 
requirement.)"PI 107 
"The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the following, that we can discover 
something wholly new. That is a mistake. The truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, 
and that we have got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the 
realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus, we have 
already got everything and need not wait for the future." (said in 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and the Vienna Circle (1979)p183 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: 
the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the 
solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything.--- 
Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!....This is connected, I believe, with our 
wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the 
right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314 
 
"Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations." BBB p125 
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These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an outline of 
behavior (human nature) from two of our greatest descriptive psychologists. In considering these 
matters we must keep in mind that philosophy (in the strict sense I consider here) is the descriptive 
psychology of higher order thought (HOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally 
overlooked -i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. In addition to failing to make it clear that 
what they are doing is descriptive psychology, philosophers rarely specify exactly what it is that they 
expect to contribute to this topic that other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so after 
noting W's above remark on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker who gives a good start on it. 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further condition ..., 
or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want to know when knowledge does and when 
it does not require justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said that he 
knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a performance, a disposition or an 
ability? Could knowing or believing that p be identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say `he 
believes that p, but it is not the case that p', whereas one cannot say `I believe that p, but it is not the 
case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, 
but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, 
whether and how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, 
foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one know, but not believe, 
something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on - through many hundreds of similar 
questions pertaining not only to knowledge and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, 
forgetting, observing, noticing, recognizing, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to 
mention the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if these 
questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various 
concepts hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and 
purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable exercise in 
connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can 
contribute nothing whatsoever." (Passing by the naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac- p15-2005). 
On his death in 1951 W left behind a scattered collection of some 20,000 pages. Apart from the 
Tractatus, they were unpublished and largely unknown, although some were widely circulated and read 
(as were notes taken in his classes), leading to extensive but largely unacknowledged influences. Some 
works are known to have been lost and many others W had destroyed. Most of this Nachlass was 
microfilmed in 1968 by Cornell University and copies were bought by a very few libraries. Budd, like 
most W commentators of the period, does not reference the microfilm. Although much of the Nachlass 
is repetitive and appears in some form in his subsequently published works (which are referenced by 
Budd), many variant texts are of great interest and there is substantial material that has never been 
translated from the original German nor published in book form. Even now (2016) we are awaiting a 
book of unpublished writings to be called ‘Dictating Philosophy’ and a new edition of the Brown Book, 
left with his lover Francis Skinner.  In 1998 the Bergen CD of the complete Nachlass appeared -- 
Wittgenstein's Nachlass: Text and Facsimile Version: The Bergen Electronic Edition 
$2500 ISBN 10: 0192686917. It is available through interlibrary loan and apparently free on the net as 
well. Like the other CDs of W’s work , it is available from Intelex (www.nlx.com). It is indexed and 
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searchable and the prime W resource.  However, my extensive readings of the W literature show that 
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very few people have bothered to consult it and thus their works are lacking a critical element. One can 
see Victor Rodych’s papers on W’s remarks on Godel for one notable exception. One major work dating 
from W’s middle period (1933) that was published as a book in 2000 is the famous Big Typescript. 
Budd’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology (1991) is one of the better treatments of W (see my 
review) but since he finished this book in 1989, neither the Big Typescript nor the Bergen CD was 
available to him and he neglected the Cornell microfilm. Nevertheless by far the most important works 
date from W’s 3rd period (ca. 1935 to 1951) and these were all used by Budd. 
In addition, there are huge problems with translation of his early 20th century Viennese German into 
modern English. One must be a master of English, German, and W in order to do this and very few are 
up to it. All of his works suffer from clear translation errors and there are more subtle questions where 
one has to understand the whole thrust of his later philosophy in order to translate. Since, in my view, 
nobody except Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) has grasped the full import of his later works, one can see 
why W has yet to be fully appreciated. Even the more or less well known critical difference between 
understanding ‘Satz’ as ‘sentence’ (i.e., an  S1 utterance)  vs ‘proposition’ (i.e., an S2 utterance) in 
various contexts has usually escaped notice. 
Few notice (Budd p29-32 and DMS in a recent article are rare exceptions) that W presciently (decades 
before chaos and complexity science came into being) suggested that some mental phenomena may 
originate in chaotic processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything corresponding to a memory 
trace. He also suggested several times that the causal chain has an end and this could mean both that it 
is just not possible (regardless of the state of science) to trace it any further and that the concept of 
`cause' ceases to be applicable beyond a certain point(p34). Subsequently, many have made similar 
suggestions without any idea that W anticipated them by decades (in fact over a century now in a few 
instances). 
With DMS I regard W’s last book ‘On Certainty’ (OC) as the foundation stone of philosophy and 
psychology. It is not really a book but notes he made during the last two years of his life while dying of 
prostate cancer and barely able to work. He seems to have been principally motivated by the realization 
that G.E. Moore’s simple efforts had focused attention on the very core of all philosophy--how it’s 
possible to mean, to believe, to know anything at all, and not to be able to doubt it. All anyone can do is 
to examine minutely the working of the language games of ‘know’ and ‘certain’ and ‘doubt’ as they are 
used to describe the primitive automated prelinguistic system one (S1) functions of our brain (my K1,C1 
and D1) and the advanced deliberative linguistic system two (S2) functions (my K2, C2 and D2). Of 
course W does not use the two systems terminology, which only came to the fore in psychology some 
half century after his death, and has yet to penetrate philosophy, but he clearly grasped the two systems 
framework (the ‘grammar’) in all of his work from the early 30’s on, and one can see clear 
foreshadowings in his very earliest writings. 
Much has been written on Moore and W and On Certainty (OC) recently, after half a century in relative 
oblivion. See e.g., Annalisa Coliva’s “Moore and Wittgenstein”(2010), “Extended Rationality” (2015), The 
Varieties of Self-Knowledge’(2016), Brice’s ‘Exploring Certainty’(2014) and Andy Hamilton’s ‘Routledge 
Philosophy GuideBook to Wittgenstein and On Certainty’ (which I will review soon) and the many books 
and papers of  Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) and Peter Hacker (PH), including Hacker’s recent 3 
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volumes on Human Nature. DMS and PH have been the leading scholars of the later W, each writing or 
editing half a dozen books (many reviewed by me) and many papers in the last decade. However the 
difficulties of coming to grips with the basics of our higher order psychology, i.e., of how language 
(approximately the same as the mind, as W showed us) works are evidenced by Coliva, one of the most 
brilliant and prolific contemporary philosophers, who made remarks in a very recent article which show 
that after years of intensive work on the later W, she does not seem to get that he has solved the most 
basic problems of the description of human behavior. As DMS makes clear, one cannot even coherently 
state misgivings about the operations of our basic psychology ( W’s ‘Hinges’ which I equate with S1) 
without lapsing into incoherence. DMS has noted the limitations of both of these workers (limitations 
shared by all students of behavior) in her recent articles, which (like those of Coliva and Hacker) are 
freely available on the net. 
 
As DMS puts it: “…the notes that make up On Certainty revolutionize the concept of basic beliefs and 
dissolve scepticism, making them a corrective, not only to Moore but also to Descartes, Hume, and all of 
epistemology. On Certainty shows Wittgenstein to have solved the problem he set out to solve – the 
problem that occupied Moore and plagued epistemology – that of the foundation of knowledge. 
Wittgenstein's revolutionary insight in On Certainty is that what philosophers have traditionally called 
'basic beliefs' – those beliefs that all knowledge must ultimately be based on – cannot, on pain of infinite 
regress, themselves be based on further propositional beliefs. He comes to see that basic beliefs are 
really animal or unreflective ways of acting which, once formulated (e.g. by philosophers), look like 
(empirical) propositions. It is this misleading appearance that leads philosophers to believe that at the 
foundation of thought is yet more thought. Yet though they may often look like empirical conclusions, 
our basic certainties constitute the ungrounded, nonpropositional underpinning of knowledge, not its 
object. In thus situating the foundation of knowledge in nonreflective certainties that manifest 
themselves as ways of acting, Wittgenstein has found the place where justification comes to an end, and 
solved the regress problem of basic beliefs – and, in passing, shown the logical impossibility of 
hyperbolic scepticism. I believe that this is a groundbreaking achievement for philosophy – worthy of 
calling On Certainty Wittgenstein's 'third masterpiece'.” I reached the same general conclusions myself 
some years ago and stated it in my book reviews. 
She continues:”… this is precisely how Wittgenstein describes Moore-type hinge certainties in On 
Certainty: they 'have the form of empirical propositions', but are not empirical propositions. Granted, 
these certainties are not putative metaphysical propositions that appear to describe the necessary 
features of the world, but they are putative empirical propositions that appear to describe the 
contingent features of the world. And therein lies some of the novelty of On Certainty. On Certainty is 
continuous with all of Wittgenstein's earlier writings – including the Tractatus – in that it comes at the 
end of a long, unbroken attempt to elucidate the grammar of our language-games, to demarcate 
grammar from language in use. Baker and Hacker have superbly elucidated the second Wittgenstein's 
unmasking of the grammatical nature of metaphysical or super-empirical propositions; what sets On 
Certainty apart is its further perspicuous distinction between some 'empirical' propositions and others 
('Our "empirical propositions" do not form a homogenous mass' (OC 213)): some apparently empirical 
and contingent propositions being in fact nothing but expressions of grammatical rules. The importance 
of this realization is that it leads to the unprecedented insight that basic beliefs – though they look like 
humdrum empirical and contingent propositions – are in fact ways of acting which, when conceptually 
elucidated, can be seen to function as rules of grammar: they underlie all thinking (OC 401). So that the 
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hinge certainty 'The earth has existed for many years' underpins all thought and action, but not as a 
proposition that strikes us immediately as true; rather as a way of acting that underpins what we do 
(e.g., we research the age of the earth) and what we say (e.g., we speak of the earth in the past tense): 
‘Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain 
propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, 
which lies at the bottom of the language-game.’ (OC 204) 
 
The non-propositional nature of basic beliefs puts a stop to the regress that has plagued epistemology: 
we no longer need to posit untenable self-justifying propositions at the basis of knowledge. In taking 
hinges to be true empirical propositions, Peter Hacker fails to acknowledge the ground-breaking insight 
that our basic certainties are ways of acting, and not 'certain propositions striking us… as true' (OC 204). 
If all Wittgenstein were doing in OC was to claim that our basic beliefs are true empirical propositions, 
why bother? He would be merely repeating what philosophers before him have been saying for 
centuries, all the while deploring an unsolvable infinite regress. Why not rather appreciate that 
Wittgenstein has stopped the regress?” (“Beyond Hacker’s Wittgenstein”-(2013)). 
 
It is amazing (and a sign of how deep the divide remains between philosophy and psychology) that (as I 
have noted many times in recent reviews) in a decade of intensive reading I have not seen one person 
make the obvious connection between W’s ‘grammar’ and the automatic reflexive functions of our brain 
which constitute System 1, and its extensions into the linguistic functions of System 2. For anyone 
familiar with the two systems framework for understanding behavior that has dominated various areas 
of psychology such as decision theory for the last several decades, it should be glaringly obvious that 
‘basic beliefs’ (or as I call them B1) are the inherited automated true-only structure of S1 and that their 
extension with experience into true or false sentences (or as I call them B2) are what non-philosophers 
call ‘beliefs’. This may strike some as a mere terminological trifle, but I have used the two systems view 
and its tabulation below as the logical structure of rationality for a decade and regard it as the single 
biggest advance in understanding higher order behavior, and hence of W or any philosophical or 
behavioral writing. In my view, the failure to grasp the fundamental importance of the automaticity of 
our behavior due to S1 and the consequent attribution of all social interaction (e.g., politics) to the 
superficialities of S2 can be seen as responsible for the inexorable collapse of industrial civilization. The 
almost universal oblivion to basic biology and psychology leads to endless fruitless attempts fix the 
world’s problems via politics, but only a drastic restructuring of society with understanding of the 
fundamental role of inclusive fitness as manifested via the automaticities of S1 has any chance to save 
the world. The oblivion to S1 has been called by Searle ‘The phenomenological Illusion’, by Pinker ‘The 
Blank Slate’ and by Tooby and Cosmides ‘The Standard Social Science Model’. 
 
OC shows W’s unique super-Socratic trialogue (narrator, interlocutor, commentator) in full bloom and 
better than anywhere else in his works. He realized by the late 20’s that the only way to make any 
progress was to look at how language actually works-otherwise one gets lost in the labyrinth of language 
from the very first sentences and there is not the slightest hope of finding one’s way out. The entire 
book looks at various uses of the word ‘know’ which separate themselves out into ‘know’ as an intuitive 
‘perceptual’ certainty that cannot meaningfully be questioned (my K1) and ‘know’ as a disposition to act 
(my K2), which functions the same as think, hope, judge, understand, imagine, remember, believe and 
many other dispositional words. As I have suggested in my various reviews of W and S, these two uses 
correspond to the modern two systems of thought framework that is so powerful in understanding 
behavior (mind, language), and this (and his other work) is the first significant effort to show how our 
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fast, prelinguistic automatic ‘mental states’ are the unquestionable axiomatic basis (‘hinges’) for our 
later-evolved, slow, linguistic, deliberative dispositional psychology. As I have noted many times, neither 
W, nor anyone else to my knowledge, has ever stated this clearly. Undoubtedly, most who read OC go 
away with no clear idea of what he has done, which is the normal result of reading any of his work. 
On Certainty (OC) was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and has only 
recently begun to draw serious attention.  There are few references to it in Searle (along with Hacker, 
W’s heir apparent and the most famous living philosopher) and one sees whole books on W with barely 
a mention. There are however reasonably good books on it by Stroll, Svensson, Coliva, McGinn and 
others and parts of many other books and articles, but the best is that of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) 
whose 2004 volume “Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” is mandatory for every educated 
person, and perhaps the best starting point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy 
and life. However (in my view) all analysis of W falls short of fully grasping his unique and revolutionary 
advances by failing to put behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which 
I will attempt here. I will not give a page by page explanation since (as with any other book dealing with 
behavior-i.e., philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, law, politics, religion, literature 
etc.) we would not get past the first few pages, as all the issues discussed here arise immediately in any 
discussion of behavior. The table below summarizing the Logical Structure of Rationality (Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought) provides a framework for this and all discussion of behavior. 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and psychology, it has become 
clear that what he laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the 
foundations of what is now known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive 
psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. Sadly, few 
realize that his works are a vast and unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as 
the day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and 
humanities, and even those few who have understood him have not realized the extent of his 
anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (e.g., the two selves of fast and slow 
thinking—see below). John Searle (S), refers to him infrequently, but his work can be seen as a 
straightforward extension of W’s, though he does not seem to see this. W analysts such as Baker and 
Hacker (B&H), Read,  Harre,  Horwich, Stern, Hutto and Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but mostly stop 
short of putting him in the center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. It should also be 
clear that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of higher order behavior are describing 
the same phenomena and ought to translate easily into one another. Thus the recently fashionable 
themes of “Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from and into W’s work (and 
they do). 
The failure of most to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited attention On Certainty (0C) 
and his other 3rd period works have received until recently, but even more to the inability of many 
philosophers and others to understand how profoundly our view of behavior alters once we embrace 
the evolutionary framework. I call the framework the descriptive psychology of higher order thought- 
DPHOT- or more precisely the study of the language used in DPHOT --which Searle calls the logical 
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structure of rationality-LSR), which grounds anthropology, sociology, politics, law, morals, ethics, 
religion, aesthetics, literature and history. 
The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, intelligent person before the 
end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least half a century earlier. One cannot help but incorporate 
T. rex and all that is relevant to it into our true-only axiomatic background via the inexorable workings 
of EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is truly stupefying that even the 
brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to 
Kant, Searle and a few others) which was laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the 
equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature (as 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but afaik nobody else, points out). 
 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP 
and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. Football or Britney Spears cannot just 
vanish from my or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed out of and 
are tied to countless others in the true- only network that begins with birth and extends in all directions 
to encompass much of our awareness and memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated 
in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a 
mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the 
result of involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions. 
The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is the default of the ‘second 
self’ of slow thinking conscious system 2, which (without education) is oblivious to the fact that the 
groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 1 
(Searle’s ‘Phenomenological Illusion’). Searle summed this up in a very insightful recent article by noting 
that many logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology because the 
creation of meaningfulness (i.e., the COS of S2) out of meaninglessness (i.e., the reflexes of S1) is not 
consciously experienced. See Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) p115-117 and my review of it. 
It is essential to grasp the W/S (Wittgenstein/Searle) framework so I will first offer some comments on 
philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of 
Searle (S),Wittgenstein (W), Baker and Hacker (B&H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) et. al. 
To grasp my simple two systems terminology and perspective, it will help to see my reviews of W/S and 
other books about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior not found in 
psychology books. To say that Searle has extended W’s work is not necessarily to imply that it is a direct 
result of W study (and he is clearly not a Wittgensteinian), but rather that because there is only ONE 
human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately 
describing behavior must be enunciating some variant or extension of what W said. 
However, S seldom mentions W and even then often in a critical way but in my view his criticisms (like 
everyone’s) nearly always miss the mark and he makes many dubious assertions for which he is often 
criticized. In present context I find the recent criticisms of DMS, Coliva and Hacker most relevant. 
Nevertheless, he is the prime candidate for the best since W and I recommend downloading the over 
100 lectures he has on the net. Unlike nearly all other philosophy lectures they are quite entertaining 
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and informative and I have heard them all at least twice.  
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically programmed 
automatisms of S1 (which I equate with W’s ‘hinges’) from the less mechanical linguistic dispositional 
behavior of S2. To rephrase: all study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart fast System 1 
(S1) and slow System 2 (S2) thinking --e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions. Searle's
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work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2 social behavior including ‘we 
intentionality’, while the later W shows how S2 is based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1, which in 
evolution and in each of our personal histories developed into conscious dispositional propositional 
thinking (acting) of S2. 
Wittgenstein famously remarked that the confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained 
by calling it a young science and that philosophers are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions 
in the way science does. He noted that this tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness. See BBB p18. Another notable comment was that if we are not 
concerned with “causes” the activities of the mind lie open before us –see BB p6 (1933). Likewise the 
20,000 pages of his nachlass demonstrated his famous dictum that the problem is not to find the 
solution but to recognize as the solution what appears to be only a preliminary. See his Zettel p312-314. 
And again he noted 80 years ago that we ought to realize that we can only give descriptions of behavior 
and that these are not hints of explanations (BBB p125). See the full quotes at other places in this 
article. 
 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of Thought: language as a 
window into human nature”) that language (mind, speech) is a window on or some sort of translation of 
our thinking or even (Fodor’s LOT, Carruthers’ ISA, etc.) that there must be some other “Language of 
Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by W, who tried to show, with hundreds of 
continually reanalyzed perspicuous examples of language in action, that language is not a picture of but 
is itself thinking or the mind, and his whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. 
Many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in my view none better than W in BBB 
p37—“if we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its 
object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now the 
sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest 
similarity with what it represents.” So language issues direct from the brain and what could count as 
evidence for an intermediary? 
W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, psychology and computation could 
reveal what his Top Down analysis of Language Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties he noted are to 
understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture vagueness –i.e., “the greatest difficulty in 
these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness” (LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral 
muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, 
which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later 
evolved Language Games (LG’s) of the Second Self--the dispositions such as imagining, knowing, 
meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second and his third periods 
are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2), the irrelevance of our 
subjective ‘mental life’ to the functioning of language, and the impossibility of private language. The 
bedrock of our behavior is our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, true-only, mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later LG’s are voluntary, System 
2, slow thinking, testable true or false dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., our whole 
psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that 
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the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have 
to stop trying to look deeper (e.g., in LWPP1—“the greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself”). 
W is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out the fact that our behavior (mostly speech) 
is the clearest picture possible of our psychology. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and 
all the rest are fascinating and powerful ways to describe and extend our innate axiomatic psychology, 
but all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, multiply our language games, and 
extend S2. The true-only axioms of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later Searle’s) “bedrock” or 
“background”, which we now call evolutionary psychology (EP), and which is traceable to the automated 
true-only reactions of bacteria, which evolved and operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). 
See the recent works of Trivers for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb “Principles of Social 
Evolution” for a pro intro. The recent travesty of evolutionary thought by Nowak and Wilson in no way 
impacts the fact that IF is the prime mechanism of evolution by natural selection (see my review of 'The 
Social Conquest of Earth' (2012)). 
 
As W develops in OC, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension (i.e., 
S2 Hinges or S2H) of our axiomatic EP (i.e., S1 Hinges or S1H) and cannot be found ‘mistaken’ without 
threatening our sanity—as he noted a ‘mistake’ in S1 (no test) has profoundly different consequences 
from one in S2 (testable). A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense) 
cannot get a foothold, as “reality” is the result of involuntary ‘fast thinking’ axioms and not testable 
propositions (as I would put it). 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, and especially 
in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see 
Kahneman--“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but neither he, nor anyone afaik, has any idea W laid out the 
framework over 50 years ago), which is involuntary and automatic and which corresponds to the mental 
states of perception, emotion and memory, as W notes over and over. One might call these 
“intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our 
slow or reflective, more or less “conscious” (beware another network of language games!) second self 
brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, which refer to 
abilities or possible actions, are not mental states, are conscious, deliberate and propositional (true or 
false), and do not have any definite time of occurrence. 
As W notes, disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar mostly philosophical use 
(but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct 
perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), 
originally termed Causally Self Referential (CSR) by Searle (but now Causally Self-Reflexive) or reflexive 
or intransitive in W’s Blue and Brown Books (BBB), and the S2 use, which is their normal use as 
dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., 
they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) in the strict sense, and are not CSR (called transitive in BBB). 
The equation of these terms from modern psychology with those used by W and S (and much else here) 
is my idea, so don’t expect to find it in the literature (except my articles on Amazon, viXra.org, 
philpapers.org , researchgate.net, academia.edu). 
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Though seldom touched upon by philosophers, the investigation of involuntary fast thinking has 
revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names 
like “cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. Of course these too are 
language games, so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and 
discussions will vary from “pure” System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear, but of 
course he did not use this terminology), but presumably not ever of slow S2 dispositional thinking only, 
since any thought (intentional action) cannot occur without involving much of the intricate S1 network 
of the “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, “automatisms”, “cognitive 
axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and Searle call our EP) which must also use S1 to move 
muscles (action). 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, that `will', `self' and 
`consciousness' (which as Searle notes are presupposed by all discussion of intentionality) are axiomatic 
true-only elements of S1, composed of perceptions, memories and reflexes., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made clear numerous times, 
they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are 
not evidential. As he famously said in OC p94—“but I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying 
myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness.-no: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false.” 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS), i.e., 
public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' 
going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of 
thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is, as there is 
no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W's aphorisms (p132 in Budd’s lovely book on W) –“It is in 
language that wish and fulfillment meet and like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.” And one might note here that 
`grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP or LSR ( DPHOT—see table) and that, in spite of his 
frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing (for which he is often incorrectly criticized by 
Searle), this is about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as 
one can find (as DMS also notes). 
W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, and Searle notes that there is a 
general way to characterize the act of meaning—“speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of 
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satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction”-- which means to speak or write a well formed sentence 
expressing COS in a context that can be true or false, and this is an act and not a mental state. i.e., as 
Searle notes in Philosophy in a New Century p193—“the basic intentional relation between the mind 
and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine 
conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of 
satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” -- propositions being public 
events that can be true or false –contra the perverse use of the word for the true-only axioms of S by 
Searle, Coliva and others. Hence, the famous comment by W from PI p217—“If God had looked into our 
minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of”, and his comments that 
the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and “what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's summation (p140 Budd) –
“what it always comes to in the end is that without any further meaning, he calls what happened the 
wish that that should happen-and- the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled 
cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. 
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied. Suppose it were asked -do I know 
what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know.” 
One of W’s recurring themes is now called Theory of Mind, or as I prefer, Understanding of Agency (UA). 
Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 (i.e., UA of S1 and S2) in experiments, has become 
aware of the work of Daniel Hutto, who has characterized UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor 
representation can be involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2—see my review of his book with 
Myin). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years 
ago. It is an easily defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, 
automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. In 
spite of the fact that most of the above has been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a century 
in the case of some of W’s teachings), I have rarely seen anything approaching an adequate discussion 
in philosophy or other behavioral science texts,  and commonly there is barely a mention. 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the behavioral 
sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the 
Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, Moyal-
Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an 
heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns 
show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of 
the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description may consult my articles and 
reviews of books by Wittgenstein, Searle and others on academia.edu, philpapers.org, 
researchgate.net, vixra.org and abbreviated versions on Amazon. 
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The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by Searle, and 
correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S 
Hacker.  The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and 
colleagues as revised by myself. 
 
(Involuntary –automated-Rules  R1)   Thinking (Cognition)(No gaps) (Voluntary-deliberative- Rules R2) Willing (Volition)(3 gaps) 
 
 Dispositions* Emotions Memory Perception Desires PI** IA*** Actions/Words 
Cause Originates From**** World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes In***** None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self Reflexive****** No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False(Testable) Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction 
 
Yes 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Describe a Mental State No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time,Place(H+N,T+T)***** *** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context Dependent/Abstract A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working Memory Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General Intelligence Dependent Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading Inhibits Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates or Inhibits I F/I F F I I I I 
17  
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, 
Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are 
designated as presentations by others ( or COS1 by myself). 
 
*  Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
 
***  Searle’s Intention In Action 
 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly calls this causally self- 
referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes 
on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only 
get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical problem—the 
use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution— 
showing the correct context. 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) which parts of 
the brain present to consciousness, are automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while 
System 2 is abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious 
deliberation (S2D-my terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can 
also become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness from coma 
through the stages of sleep to full awareness.  Memory includes short term memory (working 
memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they are 
successful or not, rather than true or false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the description of our 
perceptual experience-the presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the 
same words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or 
COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
Of course the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically connected. E.g., Emotion, 
Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be True-Only, will describe a mental state, 
belong to cognitive system 1, will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, 
cause originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in 
intensity, 
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occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are independent of 
general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have 
voluntary content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) cannot precisely 
match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion 
of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and in the infinite variations of ‘brain states’ (‘mental 
states or the pattern of activations of billions of neurons that can correspond to ‘seeing a red apple’) 
and this is one reason why it’s not possible to ‘reduce’ higher order behavior to a ‘system of laws’ 
which would have to state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. 
And what counts as ‘reducing’ and as a ‘law’ and a ‘system’ (see e.g., Nancy Cartwright).  This is a 
special case of the irreducibility of higher level descriptions to lower level ones that has been 
explained many times by Searle, DMS, Hacker, W and others.  
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make complex 
series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive 
actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, 
automated, subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, informationless, 
true-only mental states with a precise time and location, and over time there evolved in higher 
cortical centers S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space and time of events (the 
past and future and often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that 
are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private 
S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , 
true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and 
not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, 
Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions 
(described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to 
events in the world and not to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are 
slowly developing and changing results of  S2 dispositions (W- ‘Remarks on the Philosophy of 
Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and fast to appear and disappear. “I 
believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in 
spacetime.  My first person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while 
third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and memories-- 
were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed “inclinations” or 
“dispositions”. They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has 
often been noted that this is an incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing , 
remembering etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent 
public representations (as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – 
Searle-Consciousness and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space, while 
the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and 
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now.  This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate psychology 
after System 1—the ability to represent (state public COS for) events and to think of them as 
occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination 
supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., the use of “thinking” to refer to 
automatic brain processes of System One) are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- 
Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
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Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by primary LG’s ( PLG’s -- 
e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., 
axiomatic as I prefer or  animal reflexes as W and DMS describe.  Dispositions can be described as 
secondary LG’s ( SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my own 
case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event occurs—see my reviews 
of the well known books on W by Johnston and Budd. Note that Dispositions become Actions when 
spoken or written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein 
(mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 
2.  After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in 
the Blue and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler 
version of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the 
axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and 
so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation 
stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), 
cognitive linguistics or Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by DMS) the single most 
important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of  behavior.  Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, in 
which the mind automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle)--the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible. 
 
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities— 
that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit (represent) the world. Behaviorism and 
all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot 
see S1 working and describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The 
Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity 
with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access 
to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the 
Two Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be 
described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while 
Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which 
try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., Consciousness 
and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. Disposition words 
can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or 
adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often 
incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs 
(cognitive modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(believing, 
knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public acts such as language (thought, 
mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and 
there is no language (concept, thought) of private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private 
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language, 
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thought or mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. 
Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch,Temperature 
Memories:  Remembering (X was true) 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X  might become True) : 
 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, Thinking, Representing, 
Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), 
Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring , 
Expecting, Wishing , Wanting, Hoping( a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - Dreaming , Imagining, Lying, 
Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. Their function is to 
modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating 
information processing of perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation 
between S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. We can 
think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
DESIRES: ( I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts) : Longing, Hoping, 
Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, Persuading, 
Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, 
Crying, Asserting (Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, 
Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer Information to 
others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in 
explanations of behavior (The Phenomenological Illusion  (TPI), The Blank Slate (BS)or the Standard 
Social Science Model (SSSM). 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of objects nor of a 
single type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—roughly 
equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to 
intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all these 
processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive 
psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and 
neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or 
of the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, 
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development and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions.  Since the axioms 
21  
(algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our 
understanding and increase our power by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend 
them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek(2003) gives an analysis of 
dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized by R & L(1999), Spohn etc. 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of behavior which are 
innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and require consciousness, will and self, 
and in normal human adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness 
(maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly 
questionable due to severe underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing. This 
occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire Independent Reasons for 
Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of 
Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts 
(muscle movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics of this were 
figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but 
with clear foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle 
beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but 
for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (e.g., our language games) 
admits of degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our 
templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to 
be useful. 
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the dispositional 
verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and rational with partial awareness(W), now 
described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2.  It is useful to regard these as language games 
and not as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal 
“experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no 
role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental 
state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act or event 
such as in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have 
information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, for only 
then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become psychologically 
effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2. Developing language means manifesting 
the innate ability of advanced humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual 
muscles) for acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind ) is much better 
called UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2 –and 
can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed 
production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by 
contracting muscles—i.e., Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and Knowing. Thus, 
“propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow 
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deliberative functioning of System 2) or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of frequently practiced 
System 2 functions of speech and action into automatic fast functions).   We see that the efforts of 
cognitive science to 
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understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more 
about how the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we already 
know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that 
are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry , genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as 
irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be 
described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said 
“Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we 
only examine carefully the workings of language. Language (mind, public speech connected to 
potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it.  This has been explained 
frequently by Hacker, DMS and many others.  
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences have multiple uses 
depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I believe and I believed 
or I believe and he believes.  The present tense first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I 
believe” normally describe my ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) but 
can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental state and so not based on 
knowledge or information (W and see my review of the book by Hutto and Myin). In the former S1 
sense, it does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s 
raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present tense can be causally 
self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2).  
However past or future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes”  or “he will believe’ 
contain or can be resolved by information that is true or false, as they describe public acts that are or 
can become verifiable.   Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from subsequent 
actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable 
public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent (which I call S2A—i.e., 
S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock 
in her paper in Philosophical Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-Propositional ( 
NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and 
Kahnemann). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think 
one must separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 
1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional 
and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading for an understanding of 
the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are  Coliva, Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein 
and Read, who, like many scholars now, have posted most of their work (often in preprint form)  free 
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online at academia.edu, philpapers.org and other sites . Baker & Hacker are found in their 
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many joint works. The late Baker went overboard with a bizarre psychoanalytic and rather nihilistic 
interpretation that was ably refuted by Hacker whose “Gordon Baker’s Late Interpretation of 
Wittgenstein” is a must read for any student of behavior. 
One can find endless metaphysical reductionist cartoon views of life due to the attempt to explain 
higher order thought of S2 in terms of the causal framework of S1 which Carruthers (C), Dennett, the 
Churchlands (3 of the current leaders of scientism, computationalism or materialist reductionism -- 
hereafter CDC—my acronym for the Centers for (Philosophical) Disease Control) and many others 
pursue. Scientism has been debunked frequently beginning with W in the BBB in the 30’s when he noted 
that –“philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted 
to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics 
and leads the philosopher into complete darkness”- and by Searle, Read, Hutto, Hacker and countless 
others since. The attempt to ‘explain’ (really only to describe as W made clear) S2 in causal terms is 
incoherent and even for S1 it is extremely complex and it is not clear that the highly diverse language 
games of “causality” can ever be made to apply (as has been noted many times)-even their application 
in physics and chemistry is variable and often obscure (was it gravity or the abscission layer or hormones 
or the wind or all of them that made the apple fall and when did the causes start and end)? But as W 
said-“now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the 
mind lie open before us”. 
However I suggest it is a major mistake to see W as taking either side, as usually stated, as his views are 
much more subtle, more often than not leaving his trialogues unresolved. One might find it useful to 
start with my reviews of W, S etc., and then study as much of Read, Hutto, Horwich, Coliva, Hacker, 
Glock, DMS, Stern, etc. as feasible before digging into the literature of causality and the philosophy of 
science, and if one finds it uninteresting to do so then W has hit the mark. 
In spite of the efforts of W and others, it appears to me that most philosophers have little grasp of the 
subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different uses of ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what 
time it is’), or of the nature of dispositions, and many (e.g., CDC) still base their ideas on such notions as 
private language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and computationalism, which W laid to rest ¾ of a 
century ago. 
Before I read any book I go to the index and bibliography to see whom they cite. Often the authors most 
remarkable achievement is the complete or nearly complete omission of all the authors I cite here. W is 
easily the most widely discussed modern philosopher with about one new book and dozens of articles 
largely or wholely devoted to him every month. He has his own journal “Philosophical Investigations” 
and I expect his bibliography exceeds that of the next top 4 or 5 philosophers combined. Searle is 
perhaps next among moderns (and the only one with many lectures on YouTube, Vimeo, University sites 
etc.—over 100, which, unlike almost all other philosophy lectures, are a delight to listen to) and Hutto, 
Coliva, DMS, Hacker ,Read, etc., are very prominent with dozens of books and hundreds of articles, talks 
and reviews. But CDC and other metaphysicians ignore them and the thousands who regard their work 
as critically important. 
Consequently, the powerful W/S framework (as well by and large of that of modern research in thinking) 
is totally absent and all the confusions it has cleared away are abundant. If you read my reviews and the 
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works themselves, perhaps your view of most writing in this arena may be quite different.  But as W 
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insisted, one has to work the examples through oneself. As often noted, his superSocratic trialogues had 
a therapeutic intent. 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted in my other reviews and 
are extremely well known. Basically they are as simple as pie—we must have a test to differentiate 
between A and B and tests can only be external and public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle 
in the Box’. If we all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. and call what is inside a ‘beetle’ 
then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, for every box could contain a different thing or even be 
empty. So, there is no private language that only I can know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X 
is not publicly demonstrable it cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down Carruther’s ISA 
theory of mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references. I have explained W’s 
dismantling of the notion of introspection and the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional 
attitudes’) above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of Searle’s books. See Stern’s 
“Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations ”(2004) for a nice explanation of Private Language and 
everything by Read et al for getting to the roots of these issues as few do. 
CDC eschew the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a ‘higher self’. But, the very act of writing, 
reading and all language and concepts (language games) presuppose self, consciousness and will, so 
such accounts are self-contradictory cartoons of life without any value whatsoever (and zero impact on 
the daily life of anyone). W/S and others have long noted that the first person point of view is just not 
intelligibly eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person one, but absence of coherence is no problem for the 
cartoon views of life. Likewise with the description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, 
‘information processing’ etc.,-- well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker and many 
others. 
 
Writing that attempts to combine science with philosophy, with the meaning of many key terms varying 
almost at random without awareness, is schizoid and hopeless, but there are thousands of science and 
philosophy books like this. There is the description (not explanation as W made clear) of our behavior 
and then the experiments of cognitive psychology. Many of these dealing with human behavior combine 
the conscious thinking of S2 with the unconscious automatisms of S1 (absorb psychology into 
physiology). We are often told that self, will, and consciousness are illusions, since they think they are 
showing us the ‘real’ meaning of these terms, and that the cartoon use is the valid one. That is, S2 is 
‘unreal’ and must be subsumed by the scientific causal descriptions of S1. Hence, the reason for the shift 
from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind. See e.g., my review of Carruther’s recent 
‘The Opacity of Mind’.  Even Searle is a frequent offender here as noted by Hacker, Bennet and Hacker, 
DMS, Coliva etc.  
If someone says that I can’t choose what to have for lunch he is plainly mistaken, or if by choice he 
means something else such as that ‘choice’ can be described as having a ‘cause’ or that it’s not clear how 
to reduce ‘choice’ to ‘cause’ so we must regard it as illusory, then that is trivially true (or incoherent), 
but irrelevant to how we use language and how we live, which should be regarded as the point from 
which to begin and end such discussions. 
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Perhaps one might regard it as relevant that it was W, along with Kant and Nietzsche (great intellects, 
but neither of them doing much to dissolve the problems of philosophy), who were voted the best of all 
time by philosophers-not Quine, Dummett, Putnam, Kripke or CDC. 
One can see the similarity in all philosophical questions (in the strict sense I consider here, keeping in 
mind W’s comment that not everything with the appearance of a question is one). We want to 
understand how the brain (or the universe) does it but S2 is not up to it. It’s all (or mostly) in the 
unconscious machinations of S1 via DNA. We don’t ‘know’ but our DNA does, courtesy of the death of 
countless trillions of organisms over some 3 billion years. We can describe the world easily but often 
cannot agree on what an ‘explanation’ should look like. So we struggle with science and ever so slowly 
describe the mechanisms of mind. Even if we should arrive at “complete” knowledge of the brain, we 
would still just have a description of what neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing red, but it is not clear 
what it would mean (COS) to have an “explanation” of why it’s red (i.e., why qualia exist). As W said, 
explanations come to an end somewhere. 
For those who grasp the above, the philosophical parts of Carruther’s “Opacity of Mind” (a major recent 
work of the CDC school) are comprised largely of the standard confusions that result from ignoring the 
work of W, S and hundreds of others. It can be called Scientism or Reductionism and denies the ‘reality’ 
of our higher order thought, will, self and consciousness, except as these are given a quite different and 
wholly incompatible use in science. We have e.g., no reasons for action, only a brain that causes action 
etc. They create imaginary problems by trying to answer questions that have no clear sense. It should 
strike us that these views have absolutely no impact on the daily life of those who spend most of their 
adult life promoting them. This situation is nicely summed up by Rupert Read in his article ‘The Hard 
Problem of Consciousness’—“the hardcore problem becomes more and more remote, the more we de- 
humanize aspects of the mind, such as information and perception and intentionality. The problem will 
only really be being faced if we face up to it as a ‘problem’ that has to do with whole human beings, 
embodied in a context (inextricably natural and social) at a given time, etc…then it can become 
perspicuous to one that there is no problem. Only when one starts, say, to ‘theorize’ information across 
human and non-human domains (supposedly using the non-human-the animal {usually thought of as 
mechanical} or the machine-as one’s paradigm, and thus getting things back to front), does it begin to 
look as if there is a problem…that all the ‘isms’ (cognitivism, reductionism (to the brain), behaviorism 
and so on)…push further and further from our reach…the very conceptualization of the problem is the 
very thing which ensures that the ‘hard problem’ remains insoluble…no good reason has ever been 
given for us to think that there must be a science of something if it is to be regarded as real. There is no 
good reason to think that there should be a science of consciousness, or of mind or of society, any more 
than there need be a science of numbers, or of universes or of capital cities or of games or of 
constellations or of objects whose names start with the letter ‘b’…. We need to start with the idea of 
ourselves as embodied persons acting in a world, not with the idea of ourselves as brains with minds 
‘located’ in them or ‘attached’ to them… There is no way that science can help us bootstrap into an 
‘external’/’objective’ account of what consciousness really is and when it is really present. For it cannot 
help us when there is a conflict of criteria, when our machines come into conflict with ourselves, into 
conflict with us. For our machines are only calibrated by our reports in the first place. There can be no 
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such thing as getting an external point of view… that isn’t because… the hard problem is insoluble, 
…Rather, we need not admit that a problem has even been defined…’transcendental naturalism’ 
…guarantees... the keeping alive indefinitely of the problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological 
satisfaction of both a humble (yet privileged) ‘scientific’ statement of limits to the understanding and, 
the knowingness of being part of a privileged elite , that in stating those limits, can see beyond them. It 
fails to see what Wittgenstein made clear in the preface to the Tractatus. The limit can… only be drawn 
in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense.” 
Many of W’s comments come to mind. He noted 85 years ago that ‘mysteries’ satisfy a longing for the 
transcendent, and because we think we can see the ‘limits of human understanding’, we think we can 
also see beyond them, and that we should dwell on the fact that we see the limits of language(mind) in 
the fact that we cannot describe the facts which correspond to a sentence except by repeating the 
sentence (see p10 etc. in his Culture and Value, written in 1931). I also find it useful to repeat frequently 
his remark that “superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus”--written a century ago in TLP 
5.1361. 
Also apropos is his famous comment (PI p308) about the origin of the philosophical problems about 
mental processes (and all philosophical problems). "How does the philosophical problem about mental 
processes and states and about behaviorism arise? The first step is the one that altogether escapes 
notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall 
know more about them -- we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the 
matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive 
movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite 
innocent.) -- And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we 
have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we 
had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them.” 
Another seemingly trivial comment by W (PI p271) asked us to imagine a person who forgot what the 
word ‘pain’ meant but used it correctly –i.e., he used it as we do! Also relevant is W’s comment (TLP 
6.52) that when all scientific questions have been answered, nothing is left to question, and that is itself 
the answer. And central to understanding the scientistic (i.e., due to scientism not science) failures of 
CDC et al is his observation that it is a very common mistake to think that something must make us do 
what we do, which leads to the confusion between cause and reason. “And the mistake which we here 
and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it 
in the sentence “It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea 
that “something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion between cause 
and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end.” BBB 
p143 
He has also commented that the chain of causes has an end and that there is no reason in the general 
case for it to be meaningful to specify a cause. 
W saw in his own decades-long struggle the necessity of clarifying ‘grammar’ oneself by working out 
‘perspicuous examples’ and the futility for many of being told the answers. Hence his famous comments 
about philosophy as therapy and ‘working on oneself’. 
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Another striking thing about so many philosophy books (and the disguised philosophy throughout the 
behavioral sciences, physics and math) is that there is often no hint that there are other points of view— 
that many of the most prominent philosophers regard the scientistic view as incoherent. There is also 
the fact (seldom mentioned) that , provided of course we ignore its incoherence, reduction does not 
stop at the level of neurophysiology, but can easily be extended (and has often been) to the level of 
chemistry, physics, quantum mechanics, ‘mathematics’ or just ‘ideas’. What exactly should make 
neurophysiology privileged? The ancient Greeks generated the idea that nothing exists but ideas and 
Leibniz famously described the universe as a giant machine. Most recently Stephan Wolfram became a 
legend in the history of pseudoscience for his description of the universe as a computer automaton in ‘A 
New Kind of Science’. Materialism, mechanism, idealism, reductionism, behaviorism and dualism in their 
many guises are hardly news and, to a Wittgensteinian, quite dead horses since W dictated the Blue and 
Brown books in the 30’s, or at least since the subsequent publication and extensive commentary on his 
nachlass. But convincing someone is a hopeless task. W realized one has to work on oneself—self 
therapy via long hard working through of ‘perspicuous examples’ of language (mind) in action. 
An (unknowing) expression of how axiomatic psychology rules, and how easy it is to change a word’s use 
without knowing it, was given by physicist Sir James Jeans long ago: “The Universe begins to look more 
like a great thought than like a great machine."   But ‘thought’, ‘machine’, ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘cause’, ‘event’, 
 ‘happen’, ‘occur’, ’continue’, etc. do not have the same meanings (uses) in science or philosophy as in 
daily life, or rather they have the old uses mixed in at random with many new ones so there is the 
appearance of sense without sense. Much of academic discussion of behavior, life and the universe is 
high comedy (as opposed to the low comedy of most politics, religion and mass media): i.e., 
“comedy dealing with polite society, characterized by sophisticated, witty dialogue and an intricate 
plot”-(Dictionary.com). But philosophy is not a waste of time--done rightly, it is the best way to spend 
time. How else can we dispel the chaos in the behavioral sciences or describe our mental life and the 
higher order thought of System 2--the most intricate, wonderful and mysterious thing there is? 
Given this framework it should be easy to understand OC, to follow W’s examples describing how our 
innate psychology uses the reality testing of System 2 to build on the certainties of System 1, so that we 
as individuals and as societies acquire a world view of irrefutable interlocking experiences that build on 
the bedrock of our axiomatic genetically programmed reflexive perception and action to the amazing 
edifice of science and culture. The theory of evolution and the theory of relativity passed long ago from 
something that could be challenged to certainties that can only be modified, and at the other end of the 
spectrum, there is no possibility of finding out that there are no such things as Paris or Brontosaurs. The 
skeptical view is incoherent. We can say anything but we cannot mean anything. 
Thus, with DMS, I regard OC as a description of the foundation stone of human understanding and the 
most basic document on our psychology. Though written when in his 60’s, mentally and physically 
devastated by cancer, it is as brilliant as his other work and transforms our understanding of philosophy 
(the descriptive psychology of higher order thought), bringing it at last into the light, after three 
thousand years in the cave. Metaphysics has been swept away from philosophy and from physics. 
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“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no depths have been 
plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered or reconceived. How tame and 
uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, 
demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough” --Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’. 
Let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary 
philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and 
crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
An excellent recent work that displays many of the philosophical confusions in a book putatively about 
science and mathematics is Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason: What Science, Mathematics and 
Logic Cannot Tell Us’(2013). 
W noted that when we reach the end of scientific commentary, the problem becomes a philosophical 
one-i.e., one of how language can be used intelligibly. Yanofsky, like virtually all scientists and most 
philosophers, does not get that there are two distinct kinds of “questions” or “assertions”(i.e., Language 
Games or LG’s) here. There are those that are matters of fact about how the world is—that is, they are 
publicly observable propositional (True or False ) states of affairs having clear meanings (Conditions of 
Satisfaction --COS) in Searle’s terminology—i.e., scientific statements, and then there are those that are 
issues about how language can coherently be used to describe these states of affairs, and these can be 
answered by any sane, intelligent, literate person with little or no resort to the facts of science. Another 
poorly understood but critical fact is that, although the thinking, representing, inferring, understanding, 
intuiting etc. (i.e., the dispositional psychology) of a true or false statement is a function of the higher 
order cognition of our slow, conscious System 2 (S2), the decision as to whether “particles” are 
entangled, the star shows a red shift, a theorem has been proven (i.e., the part that involves seeing that 
the symbols are used correctly in each line of the proof), is always made by the fast, automatic, 
unconscious System 1 (S1) via seeing, hearing, touching etc. in which there is no information processing, 
no representation (i.e., no COS) and no decisions in the sense in which these happen in S2 ( which 
receives its inputs from S1). This two systems approach is now the standard way to view reasoning or 
rationality and is a crucial heuristic in the description of behavior, of which science, math and philosophy 
are special cases.  There is a huge and rapidly growing literature on reasoning that is indispensable to the 
study of behavior or science. A recent book that digs into the details of how we actually reason (i.e., use 
language to carry out actions—see W, DMS, Hacker, S etc.) is ‘Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science’ 
by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2008), which, in spite of its limitations (e.g., limited understanding of 
W/S and the broad structure of intentional psychology), is (as of mid 2014) the best single source I know. 
W wrote a great deal on the philosophy of mathematics since it clearly illustrated many of the types of 
confusions generated by ‘scientific’ language games, and there have been countless commentaries, 
many quite poor.  I will comment on some of the best recent work as it is brought up by Yanofsky. 
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Francisco Berto has made some penetrating comments recently.  He  notes that W denied the 
coherence of metamathematics-i.e., the use by Godel of a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely 
accounting for his “notorious” interpretation of Godel’s theorem as a paradox, and if we accept his 
argument, I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, metatheories and meta 
anything else. How can it be that such concepts (words, language games) as metamathematics and 
incompleteness, accepted by millions ( and even claimed by no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al 
to reveal fundamental truths about our mind or the universe) are just simple misunderstandings about 
how language works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding that, like so many “revelatory” philosophical 
notions (e.g., mind and will as illusions –Dennett, Carruthers, the Churchlands etc.), they have no 
practical impact whatsoever? Berto sums it up nicely: “Within this framework, it is not possible that the 
very same sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a formal system… and 
demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency hypothesis) in a different system (the meta- 
system). If, as Wittgenstein maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning of the proved sentence, 
then it is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for a sentence with the same meaning) to be 
undecidable in a formal system, but decided in a different system (the meta-system)… Wittgenstein had 
to reject both the idea that a formal system can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic 
consequence that no formal system proving only arithmetical truths can prove all arithmetical truths. If 
proofs establish the meaning of arithmetical sentences, then there cannot be incomplete systems, just 
as there cannot be incomplete meanings.” And further “Inconsistent arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical 
arithmetics based on a paraconsistent logic, are nowadays a reality. What is more important,the 
theoretical features of such theories match precisely with some of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian 
intuitions…Their inconsistency allows them also to escape from Godel’s First Theorem, and from 
Church’s undecidability result: they are, that is, demonstrably complete and decidable. They therefore 
fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, according to which there cannot be mathematical problems that 
can be meaningfully formulated within the system, but which the rules of the system cannot decide. 
Hence, the decidability of paraconsistent arithmatics harmonizes with an opinion Wittgenstein 
maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
W also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our behavior in general as 
a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as a motley of pieces assembled by the random 
processes of natural selection. “Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say (contra nearly everyone) 
that is all that Godel and Gregory Chaitin show. W commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means 
axioms or the theorems derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the 
definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one applies a test. W often noted 
that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must 
have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it cannot be 
proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be 
used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot be used in the real world either. As Victor Rodych 
notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical 
language-game) if it has an extra-systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in 
ordinary counting and measuring or in physics)…”  Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant 
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to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and 
‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., 
and with ‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “ On Wittgenstein’s 
account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus because ‘in mathematics, 
everything is algorithm [and syntax]and nothing is meaning[semantics]…” 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. “Consideration of the diagonal 
procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal 
number’ than we, being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other comments 
(see Rodych and Floyd). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of polymath physicist and 
decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems 
(1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are 
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so they 
apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build 
a physical computer that can be assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe 
does. The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus, 
and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on 
systems that are infinite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if 
one uses an infinitely fast, infinitely dense computer, with computational powers greater than that of a 
Turing Machine.” He also published what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective 
intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific footing. Although he has 
published various versions of these over two decades in some of the most prestigious peer reviewed 
physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news 
items in major science journals, few seem to have noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent books 
on physics, math, decision theory and computation without finding a reference.  
 
It is most unfortunate that Yanofsky and others have no awareness of Wolpert, since his work is the 
ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, incompleteness, and undecidability, which he 
achieves (like many proofs in Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantor’s 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms and thus may be seen as 
the last word not only on computation, but on cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme 
generality by partitioning the inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not 
how it does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent of any particular physical laws or 
computational structures in establishing the physical limits of inference for past, present and future and 
all possible calculation, observation and control. He notes that even in a classical universe Laplace was 
wrong about being able to perfectly predict the future (or even perfectly depict the past or present) and 
that his impossibility results can be viewed as a “non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle”(i.e., 
there cannot be an infallible observation or control device). Any universal physical device must be 
infinite, it can only be so at one moment in time, and no reality can have more than one (the 
“monotheism theorem”). Since space and time do not appear in the definition, the device can even be 
the entire universe across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of incompleteness with two 
inference devices rather than one self-referential device. As he says, “either the Hamiltonian of our 
universe proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike 
algorithmic information complexity) in that there is one and only one version of it that can be  
applicable throughout our universe.” Another way to say this is that one cannot have two physical 
inference devices (computers) both capable of being asked arbitrary questions about the output of 
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the other, or that the universe cannot contain a computer to which one can pose any arbitrary 
computational task, or that for any pair of physical inference engines, there are always binary valued 
questions about the state of the universe that cannot even be posed to at least one of them. One 
cannot build a computer that can predict an arbitrary future condition of a physical system before it 
occurs, even if the condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it—that is, it cannot 
process information (though this is a vexed phrase as S and Read and others note) faster than the 
universe. The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have to be 
physically coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of physics, chaos, quantum mechanics, 
causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed of light. The inference device does not have to 
be spatially localized but can be nonlocal dynamical processes occurring across the entire universe. 
He is well aware that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., 
concerning the universe as computer or the limits of ”information processing”, in a new light (though 
the indices of their writings make no reference to him and another remarkable omission is that none 
of the above are mentioned by Yanofsky either). Wolpert says it shows that the universe cannot 
contain an inference device that can process information as fast as it can, and since he shows you 
cannot have a perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can never be 
perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. He also proved that no 
combination of computers with error correcting codes can overcome these limitations. Wolpert also 
notes the critical importance of the observer (“the liar”) and this connects us to the familiar 
conundrums of physics, math and language that concern Yanofsky. Again cf. Floyd on W:”He is 
articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The argument is thus generally 
applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to any purported listing or rule-governed expression 
of them; it does not rely on any particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of 
signs. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is not essentially 
diagrammatical or representational, though it may be diagrammed and insofar as it is a logical 
argument, its logic may be represented formally). Like Turing’s arguments, it is free of a direct tie to 
any particular formalism. [The parallels to Wolpert are obvious.] Unlike Turing’s arguments, it 
explicitly invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to (and presupposes) an everyday 
conception of the notions of rules and of the humans who follow them. Every line in the diagonal 
presentation above is conceived as an instruction or command, analogous to an order given to a 
human being...”  It should be obvious how Wolpert’s work is a perfect illustration of W’s ideas of the 
separate issues of science or mathematics and those of philosophy (language games).  
Yanofsky also does not make clear the major overlap that now exists (and is expanding rapidly) between 
game theorists, physicists, economists, mathematicians, philosophers, decision theorists and others, all 
of whom have been publishing for decades closely related proofs of undecidability, impossibility, 
uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the more bizarre is the recent proof by Armando Assis 
that in the relative state formulation of quantum mechanics one can setup a zero sum game between 
the universe and an observer using the Nash Equilibrium, from which follow the Born rule and the 
collapse of the wave function. Godel was first to demonstrate an impossibility result, and (until the 
remarkable papers of David Wolpert—see below and my review article) it is the most far reaching (or 
30  
just trivial/incoherent), but there have been an avalanche of others. One of the earliest in decision 
theory was the famous General Impossibility Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow in 1951 (for 
which he got the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five of his students are now Nobel laureates so 
this is not fringe science). It states roughly that no reasonably consistent and fair voting system (i.e., no 
method of aggregating individuals’ preferences into group preferences) can give sensible results. The 
group is either dominated by one person, and so GIT is often called the “dictator theorem”, or there are 
intransitive preferences. Arrow’s original paper was titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" 
and can be stated like this:” It is impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies all of 
the following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; Unanimity; Freedom From Irrelevant 
Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” Those familiar with modern decision theory accept this and 
the many related constraining theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may find it (and all 
these theorems) incredible and in that case they need to find a career path that has nothing to do with 
any of the above disciplines. See ”The Arrow Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and 
Imperfection”(2013) among legions of publications. 
Yanofsky mentions the famous impossibility result of Brandenburger and Keisler(2006) for two person 
games (but of course not limited to “games” and like all these impossibility results it applies broadly to 
decisions of any kind) which shows that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. One 
interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically just logic) are available to the 
players in a game, then there are statements or beliefs that the players can write down or ‘think about’ 
but cannot actually hold (i.e., no clear COS). “Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that 
Bob’s assumption is wrong” seems unexceptionable and ‘recursion’ (another LG) has been assumed in 
argumentation, linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century at least, but they showed that it is impossible 
for Ann and Bob to assume these beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing body of such impossibility 
results for 1 or multiplayer decision situations (e.g., it grades into Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser 
etc). For a good technical paper from among the avalanche on the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and 
Zvesper’s paper from arXiv.org, which takes us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its title 
notes it is about “interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”) and thus to Floyd, Rodych, 
Berto, W and Godel. Many of these papers quote Yanofksy’s paper “A universal approach to self- 
referential paradoxes and fixed points. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386, 2003. Abramsky (a 
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polymath who is among other things a pioneer in quantum computing) is a friend, and so Yanofsky 
contributes a paper to the recent Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum 
Foundations’ (2013). For maybe the best recent(2013) commentary on the BK and related paradoxes 
see the 165p powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and 
Paradoxes about Knowledge and Belief’. 
For a good multi-author survey see ’Collective Decision Making(2010). 
 
Since Godel’s famous theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic ‘randomness’ 
(‘incompleteness’) throughout math (which is just another of our symbolic systems), it seems 
inescapable that thinking (behavior, language, mind) is full of impossible, random or incomplete 
statements and situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems evolved by 
chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded as unsurprising that they are not 
“complete”. For math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (again a group of LG’s) shows there are limitless 
theorems that are true but unprovable— i.e., true for no reason. One should then be able to say that 
there are limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe actual 
situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers W’s views. He 
wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his work concerns the plasticity, 
“incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of language, math and logic. The recent papers of 
Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the best introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the foundations of 
mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
As noted, David Wolpert has derived some amazing theorems in Turing Machine Theory and the limits 
of computation that are very apropros here. They have been almost universally ignored but not by well 
known econometricians Koppl and Rosser, who, in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has 
already crossed your mind”, give three theorems on the limits to rationality, prediction and control in 
economics. The first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to computability to show some logical limits 
to forecasting the future. Wolpert notes that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s 
incompleteness theorem and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as its social science analog, 
though Wolpert is well aware of the social implications. K and R ‘s second theorem shows possible 
nonconvergence for Bayesian (probabilistic) forecasting in infinite-dimensional space. The third shows 
the impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents knowing its forecasting 
program. The astute will notice that these theorems can be seen as versions of the liar paradox and the 
fact that we are caught in impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that 
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includes ourselves has been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again we 
have circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. K&R conclude “Thus, 
economic order is partly the product of something other than calculative rationality”. Bounded 
rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject of thousands of papers and hundreds of books. 
Reasoning is another word for thinking, which is a disposition like knowing, understanding, judging etc. 
As Wittgenstein was the first to explain, these dispositional verbs describe propositions (sentences 
which can be true or false) and thus have what Searle calls Conditions of Satisfaction (COS). That is, 
there are public states of affairs that we recognize as showing their truth or falsity. “Beyond reason” 
would mean a sentence whose truth conditions are not clear and the reason would be that it does not 
have a clear context. It is a matter of fact if we have clear COS (i.e., meaning) but we just cannot make 
the observation--this is not beyond reason but beyond our ability to achieve, but it’s a philosophical 
(linguistic) matter if we don’t know the COS. “Are the mind and the universe computers?” sounds like it 
needs scientific or mathematical investigation, but it is only necessary to clarify the context in which this 
language will be used since these are ordinary and unproblematic terms and it is only their context 
which is puzzling. 
As always, the first thing to keep in mind is W’s dictum that there are no new discoveries to be made in 
philosophy nor explanations to be given, but only clear descriptions of behavior (language). Once one 
understands that all the problems are confusions about how language works, we are at peace and 
philosophy in their sense has achieved its purpose. As W/S have noted, there is only one reality, so 
there are not multiple versions of the mind or life or the world that can meaningfully be given, and we 
can only communicate in our one public language. There cannot be a private language and any “private 
inner” thoughts cannot be communicated and cannot have any role in our social life. It should also be 
very straightforward to solve philosophical problems in this sense. "Now if it is not the causal 
connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." 
Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
We have only one set of genes and hence one language (mind), one behavior (human nature or 
evolutionary psychology), which W and S refer to as the bedrock or background and reflecting upon this 
we generate philosophy which S calls the logical structure of rationality and I call the descriptive 
psychology of Higher Order Thought (HOT) or, taking the cue from W, the study of the language 
describing HOT. The only interest in reading anyone’s comments on philosophical aspects of human 
behavior (HOT) is to see if its translation into the W/S framework gives some clear descriptions which 
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illuminate the use of language. If not, then showing how they have been bewitched by language dispels 
the confusion. I repeat what Horwich has noted on the last page of his superb ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Metaphilosophy’(see my review) : “What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been 
removed--yet no depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or discovered 
or reconceived.  How tame and uninspiring one might think. But perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the 
virtues of clarity, demystification and truth should be found satisfying enough.” 
Nevertheless, W/S do much explaining (or as W suggested we ought to say “describing”) and S states 
that the logical structure of rationality constitutes various theories, and there is no harm in it, provided 
one realizes they are comprised of a series of examples that let us get a general idea of how language 
(the mind) works and that as his “theories” are explicated via examples they become more like W’s 
perspicuous descriptions. “A rose by any other name...” When there is a question one has to go back to 
the examples or consider new ones. As W noted, language (life) is limitlessly complex and context 
sensitive (W being the unacknowledged father of Contextualism), and so it is utterly unlike physics 
where one can often derive a formula and dispense with the need for further examples. Scientism (the 
use of scientific language and the causal framework) leads us astray in describing HOT. Once again:  
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask 
and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads 
the philosopher into complete darkness.”(BBB p18). Unlike so many others, S has largely avoided and 
often demolished scientism, but there is a residue which evinces itself when he insists on using 
dispositional S2 terms which describe public behavior (thinking, knowing believing etc.) to describe S1 
‘processes’ in the brain, that e.g., we can understand consciousness by studying the brain, and that he is 
prepared to give up causality, will or mind. W made it abundantly clear that such words are the hinges or basic 
language games and giving them up or even changing them is not a coherent concept. As noted in my other 
reviews, I think the residue of scientism results from the major tragedy of S’s (and nearly all other 
philosopher’s) philosophical life --his failure to take the later W seriously enough (W died a few years 
before S went to England to study) and making the common fatal mistake of thinking he is smarter than 
W.  
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical 
investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of 
recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already 
said everything.---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!….This is connected, 
I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a 
description, if we give it the right place in our considerations.  If we dwell upon it, and do not try to 
get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” BBB p125 
 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and contemporary psychology, that `will', `self' and 
`consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of the reptilian subcortical System One (S1) composed 
of perceptions, memories and reflexes, and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of 
giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
Philosophers are rarely clear about exactly what it is that they expect to contribute that other students 
of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so, noting W’s above remark on science envy, I will quote from P.M.S 
Hacker (the leading expert on W for many years) who gives a good start on it and a counterblast to 
scientism. 
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“Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a further condition …, 
or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ...What needs to be clarified if
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these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the 
various concepts hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and incompatibilities, 
their point and purpose, their presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To 
this venerable exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, 
psychology, neuroscience and self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever.” (Passing 
by the naturalistic turn: on Quine’s cul-de-sac- p15-2005) 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide array of 
automatic universal cultural deontic relationships so well described by Searle. I expect this fairly well 
abstracts the basic structure of social behavior. 
 
Several comments bear repeating.  So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and 
contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content (i.e. is representational) and is 
downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I 
would translate the paragraphs from S’s MSW p39 beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with 
"conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are caused by the 
automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP as modified by S2 (‘free will’). We try to match 
how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire and 
imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention-- and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally dependent upon (have their 
Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) originating in) the Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) rapid automatic 
primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended 
cases such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection of the COS with 
S1 is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in the present. S1 
and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated seamlessly by learned deontic cultural relations, 
so that our normal experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of 
cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI). 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology 
because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness 
out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the 
phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
Disposition words (Preferences--see above table) have at least two basic uses. One refers to the true- 
only sentences describing our direct perceptions, reflexes (including basic speech) and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology which are Causally Self Reflexive (CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in 
W’s BBB), and the S2 use as disposition words (thinking, understanding, knowing etc) which can be 
acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of 
Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR(called transitive in BBB). 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise? 
– The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk about processes and states and leave 
their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. But that is just 
what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it 
means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, 
and it was the very one we thought quite innocent).—And now the analogy which was to make us 
understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet 
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unexplored medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental processes. And naturally we 
don’t want to deny them.   W’s PI p308 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of 
satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, 
and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is 
a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose that every 
mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it 
is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by 
analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
Like Carruthers, Coliva, S and others sometime state (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, 
perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many 
times in my reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, 
that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only.  However since what S and various 
authors here call the background (S1) gives rise to S2 and is in turn partly controlled by S2, there has to 
be a sense in which S1 is able to become propositional and they and Searle note that the unconscious or 
conscious but automated activities of S1 must be able to become the conscious or deliberative ones of 
S2. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 
generates that of S2, but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is 
intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be 
possible. It would e.g., mean that truth and falsity and the facts of the world could be decided without 
consciousness. As W stated often and showed so brilliantly in his last book ‘On Certainty’, life must be 
based on certainty-- automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and 
pause to reflect will die--no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Again I will repeat some crucial notions. 
 
Another crucial notion clarified by S is the Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). I would 
translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We yield to our desires (need to 
alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time), which produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or 
later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and 
those closely related)." And I would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2 as "The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the 
conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires." Agents do indeed 
consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are very restricted extensions of 
unconscious DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). Obama and the Pope wish to help the poor because it is “right” 
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but the ultimate cause is a change in their brain chemistry that increased the inclusive fitness of their 
distant ancestors. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive causal 
actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2, which produces reasons for 
action that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general 
mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of the 
brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank 
Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has generated the 
action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with 
modern biology and psychology can see that this view is not credible. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public truth conditions. 
Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind 
in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or 
without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). 
Thus W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd-Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology) "It is in language that 
wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and reality 
is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note here that `grammar' in W can 
usually be translated as Evolutionary Psychology (EP) and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of higher order descriptive 
psychology (philosophy) as one can find—beyond even Searle’s ‘theories’ (who often criticizes W for his 
famous anti-theoretical stance). 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. It is the 
last interpretation” W BBB p34 
 “Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy”(2008) is a superb and unique book, but so totally 
ignored that my 2015 review is the only one! It should be obvious that philosophical issues are always 
about mistakes in language used to describe our universal innate psychology and there is no useful 
sense in which there can be a Chinese, French, Christian, Feminist etc. view of them. Such views can 
exist of 
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philosophy in the broad sense but that is not what philosophy of mind (or to W, S or me what any 
interesting and substantive philosophy) is about.  It could take a whole book to discuss this and S does 
an excellent job, so I will just comment here that re p35 propositions are S2 and not mental states which 
are S1 as W made quite clear over ¾ of a century ago and that both Quine and Davidson were equally 
confused about the basic issues involved (both Searle and Hacker have done excellent demolitions of 
Quine). As often, S’s discussion is marred by his failure to carry his understanding of W’s “background” 
to its logical conclusion and so he suggests (as he has frequently) that he might have to give up the 
concept of free will—a notion I find(with W) is incoherent. What are the COS (the truthmaking event, 
the test or proof) that could show the truth vs the falsity of our not having a choice to lift our arm? 
Likewise (p62) nobody can give arguments for the background(i.e., our axiomatic EP) as our being able 
to talk at all presupposes it (as W noted frequently). It’s also true that “reduction” along with “monism”, 
“reality”, etc. are complex language games and they do not carry meaning along in little backpacks! One 
must dissect ONE usage in detail to get clear and then see how another useage (context) differs. 
Philosophers (and would-be philosophers) create imaginary problems by trying to answer questions that 
have no clear sense. This situation is nicely analyzed by Finkelstein in ‘Holism and Animal Minds’ and 
summed up by Read in ‘The Hard Problem of Consciousness’--the hardcore problem becomes more and 
more remote, the more we de-humanize aspects of the mind, such as information and perception and 
intentionality…Only when one starts, say, to ‘theorize’ information across human and non-human 
domains (supposedly using the non-human-the animal {usually thought of as mechanical} or the 
machine-as one’s paradigm, and thus getting things back to front), does it begin to look as if there is a 
problem…that all the ‘isms’ (cognitivism, reductionism (to the brain), behaviorism and so on)…push 
further and further from our reach…the very conceptualization of the problem is the very thing which 
ensures that the ‘hard problem’ remains insoluble…no good reason has ever been given for us to think 
that there must be a science of something if it is to be regarded as real. There is no good reason to think 
that there should be a science of consciousness, or of mind or of society, any more than there need be a 
science of numbers, or of universes or of capital cities or of games or of constellations or of objects 
whose names start with the letter ‘b’…. We need to start with the idea of ourselves as embodied 
persons acting in a world, not with the idea of ourselves as brains with minds ‘located’ in them or 
‘attached’ to them… There is no way that science can help us bootstrap into an ‘external’/’objective’ 
account of what consciousness really is and when it is really present. For it cannot help us when there is 
a conflict of criteria, when our machines come into conflict with ourselves, into conflict with us. For our 
39  
asking the same  questions.  As long  as there  continues to be a verb ´to be´  that looks   as if it 
machines are only calibrated by our reports in the first place...we need not admit that a problem has 
even been defined…’transcendental naturalism’ …guarantees... the keeping alive indefinitely of the 
problem. It offers the extraordinary psychological satisfaction of both a humble (yet privileged) 
‘scientific’ statement of limits to the understanding and, the knowingness of being part of a privileged 
elite , that in stating those limits, can see beyond them. It fails to see what Wittgenstein made clear in 
the preface to the Tractatus. “The limit can… only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side 
of the limit will be simply nonsense”. 
 
Wittgenstein’s ``Culture and Value``(published in 1980), but written decades earlier), though it´s 
perhaps his least interesting book, has much that is pertinent to this discussion, and of course to a 
large part of  modern intellectual life. 
 
 ``There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical expressions has been 
responsible for so  much sin as  it has in mathematics.`` 
 
 ``People say again and again that philosophy doesn´t really progress,  that  we are  still occupied with 
the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks.  But the people who say this don´t  understand 
why is has  to be so.  It is because our language has remained   the  same  and keeps seducing us into 
 
functions  in the same was  as ´to eat´ and ´to  drink´,  as long as we still  have  the adjectives ´identical´, 
´true´, ´false´, ´possible´, as long as we continue to talk of a river of time, of an expanse of space, etc., 
etc., people will keep stumbling over the same puzzling difficulties and find themselves staring at 
something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up.  And what´s more, this  satisfies  a 
longing for the transcendent, because, insofar as people think they can see `the limits of human 
understanding´,  they believe   of course  that  they can see beyond these.`` 
 
 Likewise let us try to distill the essence from two of Searle’s recent works. 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the nature of the 
fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and 
evaluations?...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's guillotine, the 
rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which already presupposes the falsity of the 
distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
 
"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, are created 
by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations...the forms of the status function in question 
are almost invariably matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action...these deontic structures make possible 
desire-independent reasons for action...The general point is very clear: the creation of the general field 
of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent 
reasons for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
That is, the functioning of our linguistic System 2 presupposes that of our pre-linguistic System 1. 
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"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology 
because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness 
out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the 
phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
That is, our mental functioning is usually so preoccupied with system 2 as to be oblivious to system 1. 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of 
satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, 
and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is 
a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"So status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by collective intentionality 
and they function by carrying deontic powers...With the important exception of language itself, all of 
institutional reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have 
the logical form of Declarations...all of human institutional reality is created and maintained in existence 
by (representations that have the same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases 
that are not speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations." Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world direction of fit. And desires 
and intentions, like orders and promises, have the upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. 
Beliefs or perceptions, like statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in 
that sense they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction of fit. The conative- 
volitional states such as desires, prior intentions and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have 
the world-to-mind direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we 
would like them to be or how we intend to make them be...In addition to these two faculties, there is a 
third, imagination, in which the propositional content is not supposed to fit reality in the way that the 
propositional contents of cognition and volition are supposed to fit...the world-relating commitment is 
abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment that it represent with either 
direction of fit." Searle MSW p15 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose that every 
mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it 
is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by 
analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
 
"But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create 
facts in the world by representing those facts as already existing. This remarkable feat requires a 
language" MSW p69 
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"...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because there is no way you 
can make explicit speech acts performed according to the conventions of a language without creating 
commitments. This is true not just for statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) on our thoughts 
(propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate 
term `propositional attitudes' by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of PNC: 
"Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of 
satisfaction that the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have 
conditions of satisfaction." As S states it in PNC, "A proposition is anything at all that can determine a 
condition of satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that such and such is the case." Or, one 
needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear 
in MSW. Regarding intentions, "In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally in the 
production of the action."(MSWp34). 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. The 
capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on 
two levels at once, in a way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker 
intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents something. 
And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level it is a physical object like any other. At 
another level it has a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs" MSW p74 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical 
conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which inform others that it 
sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic 
or protolinguistic interactions in which gross muscle movements were able to convey very limited 
information about intentions. 
 
Most people will benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or "RPP1 and 2" or DMS's two books 
on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true-only sentences describing S1 
and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to Searle's taking 
S1 perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can only become T or F 
(aspectual as S calls them in MSW) after one begins thinking about them in S2. 
 
Searle often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of one event so for 
Intention in Action (IA) "We have different levels of description where one level is constituted by the 
behavior at the lower level...in addition to the constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal by 
means of relation."(p37 MSW). 
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"The crucial proof that we need a distinction between prior intentions and intentions-in-action is that 
the conditions of satisfaction in the two cases are strikingly different."(p35 MSW). The COS of PI need a 
whole action while those of IA only a partial one. He makes clear (e.g., p34) that prior intentions (PI) 
are mental states (i.e., unconscious S1) while they result in intentions-in-action (IA) which are 
conscious acts(i.e., S2) but both are causally self-reflexive (CSR). The critical argument that both are 
CSR is that (unlike beliefs and desires) it is essential that they figure in bringing about their COS. These 
descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 (p38 MSW), which Searle has used 
for many years and is the basis for the much extended one I present here and in my many articles. In 
my view it helps enormously to relate this to modern psychological research by using my S1, S2 
terminology and W's true-only vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus CSR references S1 
true-only perception, memory and intention, while S2 refers to dispositions such as belief and desire. 
 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd period work and from 
the observations of contemporary psychology, that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-
only elements of System 1 just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, 
they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are 
not evidential. 
 
It is critical to understand the notion of `function' that is relevant here. "A function is a cause that serves 
a purpose...In this sense functions are intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent...status 
functions... require... collective imposition and recognition of a status"(p59 MSW). 
 
 
I suggest the translation of "The intentionality of language is created by the intrinsic, or mind- 
independent intentionality of human beings" (p66 MSW) as "The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of 
S2 is generated by the unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1". That is, one must keep in mind 
that behavior is programmed by biology. 
 
Searle states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional 
(i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear 
that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is 
axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic 
intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it would mean 
that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, 
life would not be possible. As W showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must be 
based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and 
pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of vocal muscles enable 
much higher bandwidth information transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average 
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several orders of magnitude higher for visual information. 
 
S1 and S2 are critical parts of human EP and are the results, respectively of billions and hundreds of 
millions of years of natural selections by inclusive fitness. They facilitated survival and reproduction in 
the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and mentally bottoms 
out in genetics. All the vague talk in S’s MSW (e.g., p114) about `extra-linguistic conventions' and `extra 
semantical semantics' is in fact referring to EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms of S1 
which are the basis for all behavior. As W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason invisible. 
 
 
Here again is my summary (following S in MSW) of how practical reason operates: We yield to our 
desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action 
(DIRA-- i.e., desires displaced in space and time, often for reciprocal altruism--RA), which produce 
dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our 
inclusive fitness- IF (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related). 
 
I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not at all unique to humans (think 
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mother hen defending her brood from a fox) if we include the automated prelinguistic reflexes of S1 
(i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA of S2 (DIRA2) that require language are uniquely 
human. The paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2 (i.e., the S2 acts and their cultural 
extensions that are desire independent) is that the unconscious DIRA1, serving long term inclusive 
fitness, generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal immediate desires. 
Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are very restricted 
extensions of unconscious or merely automated DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
Following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive actions and 
cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for questioning. You cannot doubt you are 
reading this page as your awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
Inevitably, W’s famous demonstrations of the uselessness of introspection and the impossibility of a 
truly private language pop up repeatedly (“…introspection can never lead to a definition…” p8). The 
basics of this argument are extremely simple—no test, no language and a test can only be public. If I 
grow up alone on a desert island with no books and one day decide to call the round things on the trees 
‘coconut’ and then next day I see one and say ‘coconut’ it seems like I have started on a language. But 
suppose what I say (since there is no person or dictionary to correct me) is ‘coca’ or even ‘apple’ and the 
next day something else? Memory is notoriously fallible and we have great trouble keeping things 
straight even with constant correction from others and with incessant input from media. This may seem 
like a trivial point but it is central to the whole issue of the Inner and the Outer—i.e., our true-only 
untestable statements of our experience vs the true or false testable statements regarding everything in 
the world, including our own behavior. Though W explained this with many examples beginning over ¾ 
of a century ago, it has rarely been understood and it is impossible to go very far with any discussion of 
behavior unless one does.  As W, S, Hutto, Budd, Hacker, DMS, Johnston and others have explained, 
anyone who thinks W has an affinity with Skinner, Quine, Dennett, Functionalism or any other 
behaviorist excretions that deny our inner life needs to go back to the beginning. 
Budd’s ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’(1991) is one of the better works for gaining insight so I 
discuss it in detail. 
On p21 he begins discussing dispositions (i.e., S2 abilities such as thinking, knowing, believing) which 
seem like they refer to mental  states (i.e., to S1 automatisms), another major confusion which W was 
the first to set straight. Thus on p28 ‘reading’ must be understood as another dispositional ability that is 
not a mental state and has no definite duration like thinking, understanding, believing etc. 
 
Few notice (Budd p29-32, Stern, Johnston and Moyal-Sharrock are exceptions) that W presciently 
(decades before chaos and complexity science came into being) suggested that some mental 
phenomena may originate in chaotic processes in the brain-that e.g., there is not anything 
corresponding to a memory trace. He also suggested several times that the causal chain has an end and 
this could mean both that it is just not possible (regardless of the state of science) to trace it any 
further or that the concept of `cause' ceases to be applicable beyond a certain point(p34). 
Subsequently, many have made similar suggestions without any idea that W anticipated them by 
decades (in fact over a century now in a few instances). On p32 the “counter-factual conditionals” refer 
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again to dispositions such as “may think it’s
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raining” which are possible states of affairs (or potential actions—Searle’s conditions of satisfaction) 
which may arise in chaos. It may be useful to tie this to Searle’s 3 gaps of intentionality which he finds 
critically necessary. 
Budd notes W’s famous comment on p33 -- “The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning 
something consists in.” Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes (as quoted above) that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker 
meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” which is an act and 
not a mental state. As Budd notes on p35 this can be seen as another statement of his argument against 
private language (personal interpretations vs publicly testable ones). Likewise with rule following and 
interpretation on p36 -41—they can only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or private 
interpretations either. And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, being 
misled by W’s frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it’s just arbitrary public practice that 
underlies language and social conventions. W makes clear many times that such conventions are only 
possible given an innate shared psychology which he often calls the background. Budd correctly rejects 
this misinterpretation several times (e.g., p58). 
In Budd’s next chapter he deals with sensations which in my terms (and in modern psychology) is S1 and 
in W’s terms the true-only undoubtable and untestable background. His comment (p47)...” that our 
beliefs about our present sensations rest upon an absolutely secure foundation- the ‘myth of the given’ is 
one of the principal objects of Wittgenstein’s attack...” can easily be misunderstood. Firstly, he makes the 
universal mistake of calling these ‘beliefs’, but it is better to reserve this word for S2 true or false 
dispositions. As W made very clear, the sensations, memories and reflexive acts of S1 are axiomatic and 
not subject to belief in the usual sense but are better called understandings (my U1). Unlike our S2 beliefs 
(including those about other peoples S1 experiences), there is no mechanism for doubt. Budd explains 
this well, as on p52 where he notes that there is no possible justification for saying one is in pain. That is, 
justifying means testing and that is possible with S2 dispositional slow conscious thinking, not S1 reflexive 
fast unconscious processing. His discussion of this on p52-56 is excellent but in my view, like everyone 
who discusses W on rules, private language and the inner, all he needs to do is say that in S1 there is no 
possible test and this is the meaning of W’s famous the ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward 
criteria’. That is, introspection is vacuous. 
 
Budd’s footnote 21 confuses the true-only causal experiences of S1 and the reasoned dispositions of S2. 
 
The point of the next few pages on names for ‘internal objects’ (pains, beliefs, thoughts etc.) is again 
that they have their use (meaning) and it is the designation of dispositions to act, or in Searle’s terms, 
the specification of Conditions of Satisfaction, which make the utterance true. 
Again, Budd’s discussion of “Sensations and Causation” is wrong in stating that we ‘self ascribe’ or 
‘believe’ in our sensations or ‘take a stance’ (Dennett) that we have a pain or see a horse, but rather we 
have no choice—S1 is true-only and a mistake is a rare and bizarre occurrence and of an entirely 
different kind than a mistake in S2. And S1 is causal as opposed to S2,which concerns reasons, and that 
is why seeing the horse or feeling the pain or jumping out of the way of a speeding car is not subject to 
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judgments or mistakes. But he gets in right again—“So the infallibility of non-inferential self-ascriptions 
of pain is compatible with the thesis that a true self-ascription of pain must be caused by a physical 
event in the subject’s body, which is identical with the pain he experiences (p67).” I do not accept his 
following statement that W would not accept this based on one or two comments in his entire corpus, 
since in his later work (notably OC) he spends hundreds of pages describing the causal automated 
nature of S1 and how it feeds into (causes) S2 which then feeds back to S1 to cause muscle movements 
(including speech). Animals survive only because their life is totally directed by the phenomena around 
them which are highly predictable (dogs may jump but they never fly). 
The next chapter on Seeing Aspects describes W’s extensive comments on how S1 and S2 interact and 
where our language is ambiguous in what we may mean by ‘seeing’. In general it’s clear that ‘seeing as’ 
or aspectual seeing is part of the slow S2 brain actions while just seeing is the true-only S1 automatisms, 
but they are so well integrated that it is often possible to describe a situation in multiple ways which 
explains W’s comment on p97.He notes that W is exclusively interested in what I have elsewhere called 
‘Seeing2’ or ‘Concepts2’—i.e., aspectual or S2 higher order processing of images. 
Here, as throughout this book and indeed in any discussion of W or of behavior, it is of great value to 
refer to Johnston’s ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’(1993) and especially to his discussions of the 
indeterminate nature of language. 
In Budd’s chapter 5 we again deal with a major preoccupation of W’s later work—the relations between 
S1 and S2. As I have noted in my other reviews, few have fully understood the later W and, lacking the 
S1,S2 framework it is not surprising. Thus Budd’s discussion of seeing (automatic S1) vs visualizing 
(conscious S2 which is subject to the will) is severely hampered. Thus one can understand why one 
cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the domination of S2 by S1 (p110). And on p115 it is the 
familiar issue of there being no test for my inner experiences, so whatever I say comes to mind when I 
imagine Jack’s face counts as the image of Jack. Similarly with reading and calculation which can refer to 
S1, S2 or a combination and there is the constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes where 
that lack of any test makes them inapplicable.  See Bennet and Hacker’s ‘Neurophilosophy’, DMS, etc. 
for discussions.  On p120 et seq. Budd mentions two of W’s famous examples used for combatting this 
temptation—playing tennis without a ball (‘S1 tennis’), and a tribe that had only S2 calculation so 
‘calculating in the head (‘S1 calculating’) was not possible. ‘Playing’ and ‘calculating’ describe actual or 
potential acts—i.e., they are disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said 
before one really ought to keep them straight by writing ‘playing1’ and ‘playing2’ etc. But we are not 
taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss ‘calculating1’ as a fantasy, or we think we can leave 
its nature undecided until later. Hence W’s famous comment (p120)—“The decisive movement in the 
conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite innocent.” 
Chapter 6 explains another frequent topic of W’s—that when we speak, the speech itself is our thought 
and there is not some other prior mental process and this can be seen as another version of the private 
language argument -- there are no such things as ‘inner criteria’ which enable us to tell what we thought 
before we act (speak). 
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The point of W’s comments (p125) about other imaginable ways to use the verb ‘intend’ is that they 
would not be the same as our ‘intend’—i.e., the name of a potential event (PE) and in fact it is not clear 
what it would mean. “I intend to eat” has the COS of eating but if it meant (COS is) eating then it 
wouldn’t describe an intention but an action and if it meant saying the words (COS is speech) then it 
wouldn’t have any further COS and how could it function in either case? 
To the question on p127 as to when a sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), we can say ‘When 
it has clear COS’ and this means has public truth conditions. Hence the quote from W: ” When I think in 
language, there aren’t ‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the 
language is itself the vehicle of thought.” And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus W’s lovely aphorisms (p132) “It is in 
language that wish and fulfillment meet” and “Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.” And one might note here that 
‘grammar’ in W can usually be translated as ‘EP’ and that in spite of his frequent warnings against 
theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and higher order 
descriptive psychology as one can find. Again this quashes Searle’s frequent criticism of W as anti- 
theoretical—it all depends on the nature of the generalization. 
 
It helps greatly in this section of Budd on the harmony of thought with reality (i.e., of how dispositions 
like expecting, thinking, imagining work-- what it means to utter them) to state them in terms of S’s COS 
which are the PE (possible events) which make them true. If I say I expect Jack to come then the COS (PE) 
which makes it true is that Jack arrives and my mental states or physical behavior(pacing the room, 
imagining Jack) are irrelevant. The harmony of thought and reality is that jack arrives regardless of my 
prior or subsequent behavior or any mental states I may have and Budd is confused or at least confusing 
when he states (p132 bottom) that there must be an internal description of a mental state that can agree 
with reality and that this is the content of a thought, as these terms should be restricted to the 
automatisms of S1 only and never used for the conscious functions of S2. The content (meaning) of the 
thought that Jack will come is the outer (public) event that he comes and not any inner mental event or 
state, which the private language argument shows is impossible to connect to the outer events. We have 
very clear verification for the outer event but none at all for ‘inner events’. And as W and S have 
beautifully demonstrated many times, the speech act of uttering the sentence ‘I expect Jack to come’ just 
is the thought that Jack will come and the COS is the same—that Jack does come. And so the answer to 
the two questions on p133 and the import of W’s comment on p 135 should now be crystal clear—“In 
virtue of what is it true that my expectation does have that content?” and “What has become now of the 
hollow space and the corresponding solid?” as well as “…the interpolation of a shadow between the 
sentence and reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow.” And thus it 
should also be quite clear what Budd is referring to as to what makes it “possible for there to be the 
required harmony (or lack of harmony) with reality.” 
Likewise with the question in the next section-- what makes it true that my image of Jack is an image of 
him? Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the image I have in my head is Jack and that’s 
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why I will say ‘YES’ if shown his picture and ‘NO’ if shown one of someone else. The test here is not that 
the photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the COS that) to be an image of 
him. Hence the famous quote from W: “If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able 
to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)” and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in “that’s Him” and “…what gives the image its interpretation is the path on 
which it lies.”  Hence W’s summation (p140) that “What it always comes to in the end is that without 
any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen”… the question whether 
I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my 
wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied”…Suppose it were asked ‘Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then 
I do know.” Disposition words refer to PE’s which I accept as fulfilling the COS and my mental states, 
emotions, change of interest etc have no bearing on the way dispositions function. 
As Budd rightly notes, I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, desiring etc. depending on 
the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express. Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions 
which can only be expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
W never devoted as much time to emotions as he did to dispositions so there is less substance to 
chapter 7. He notes that typically the object and cause are the same—i.e., they are causally self- 
referential (or self reflexive as Searle now prefers)—a concept further developed by S. If one looks at 
my table, it is clear emotions have much more in common with the fast, true-only automatisms of S1 
than with the slow, true or false thinking of S2, but of course S1 feeds S2 and in turn is often fed by it. 
Budd’s summary is a fitting end to the book (p165). “The repudiation of the model of ‘object and 
designation’ for everyday psychological words—the denial that the picture of the inner process provides 
a correct representation of the grammar of such words, is not the only reason for Wittgenstein’s 
hostility to the use of introspection in the philosophy of psychology. But it is its ultimate foundation.” 
 
Now let us take another dose of Searle. 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a pattern which 
it shares with its computational simulation, because the existence of the pattern does not explain how 
the system actually works as a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies 
no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal explanations of cognition... 
There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal 
levels of description." Searle Philosophy in a New Century(PNC) p101-103 
 
"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science is at much too high a 
level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded 
to this difference by the fact that the same sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to 
record both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of vision...in the sense 
of `information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false to say that the brain is an information 
processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
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"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously suppose that every 
mental representation must be consciously thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it 
is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can 
succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by 
analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-32 
And another shot of Wittgenstein. 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything...One might 
give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our 
requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a 
requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: 
the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the 
solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything.--- 
Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution!....This is connected, I believe, with our 
wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the 
right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically programmed 
automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not 
only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture. 
 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2 social behavior due to the 
recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true- 
only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
 
One thing to keep in mind is that philosophy has no practical impact whatsoever except to clear up 
confusions about how language is being used in particular cases. Like various ‘physical theories’ but 
unlike other cartoon views of life (religious, political, psychological, sociological, anthropological), it is 
too cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more than a tiny fringe and it is so unrealistic that even its 
adherents totally ignore it in their everyday life. Likewise with other academic ‘theories of life’ such as 
the Standard Social Science Model widely shared by sociology, anthropology, pop psychology, history 
and literature. However, religions big and small, political movements, and sometimes economics often 
generate or embrace already existing cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit 
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forces terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions (EP defaults), and help to lay waste to the 
earth (the real purpose of nearly every social practice and institution, which are there to facilitate 
replication of genes and consumption of resources).  The point is to realize that these are on a 
continuum with philosophical cartoons and have the same source (our evolved psychology). All of us 
could be said to generate/absorb various cartoon views of life when young and only a few ever grow out 
of them. 
Also note that, as W remarked long ago, the prefix “meta” is unnecessary and confusing in most (maybe 
all) contexts, so for ‘metacognition’ anywhere substitute ‘cognition’ or ‘thinking’, since thinking about 
what we or others believe or know is thinking like any other and does not have to be seen as 
‘mindreading’ (Understanding of Agency or UA in my terminology) either. In S’s terms, the COS are the 
test of what is being thought and they are identical for ‘it’s raining’, I believe it’s raining’, ‘I belive I 
believe it’s raining’ and ‘he believes it’s raining’ (likewise for ‘knows’, wishes, judges, understands, etc.), 
namely that it’s raining. This is the critical fact to keep in mind regarding ‘metacognition’ and 
‘mindreading’ of dispositions (‘propositional attitudes’). 
Now for a few extracts from my review of Carruthers’ (C) ‘The Opacity of Mind’ (2013) which is replete 
with the classical confusions dressed up as science. It was the subject of a precis in Brain and 
Behavioral Sciences ( BBS)  that is not to be missed. 
One of the responses in BBS was by Dennett (who shares most of C’s illusions), who seems to find these 
ideas quite good, except that C should eliminate the use of ‘I’ since it assumes the existence of a higher 
self (the aim being hard reduction of S2 to S1). Of course the very act of writing, reading and all the 
language and concepts of anything whatsoever presuppose self, consciousness and will (as S often 
notes), so such an account would be just a cartoon of life without any value whatsoever, which one 
could say of most philosophical and many ‘scientific’ disquisitions on behavior. The W/S framework has 
long noted that the first person point of view is not eliminable or reducible to a 3rd person one, but this 
is no problem for the cartoon view of life. Likewise with the description of brain function or behavior as 
‘computational’, ‘information processing’ etc, -- all well debunked countless times by W/S, Hutto, Read, 
Hacker and many others. Worst of all is the crucial but utterly unclear “representation”, for which I think 
S’s use as a condition of satisfaction (COS) is by far the best. That is, the ‘representation’ of ‘I think it’s 
raining’ is the COS that it’s raining. 
 
Saddest of all is that C (like Dennett and Searle) thinks he is an expert on W, having studied him early in 
his career and decided that the private language argument is to be rejected as ‘behaviorism’! W 
famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work is devoted to describing why it cannot serve as a 
description of behavior. “Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really 
saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a 
grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) And one can also point to real behaviorism in C in its modern 
‘computationalist’ form. W/S insist on the indispensability of the first person point of view while C 
apologizes to D in the BBS article for using “I” or “self”. 
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Hutto has shown the vast gulf between W and Dennett (D) which will serve to characterize C as well, 
since I take D and C (along with the Churchland’s and many others) to be on the same page. S is one of 
many who have deconstructed D in various writings and these can all be read in opposition to C. And let 
us recall that W sticks to examples of language in action, and once one gets the point he is mostly very 
easy to follow, while C is captivated by ‘theorizing’ (i.e., chaining numerous sentences with no clear COS) 
and rarely bothers with specific language games, preferring experiments and observations that are quite 
difficult to interpret in any definitive way (see the BBS responses), and which in any case have no 
relevance to higher level descriptions of behavior (e.g., exactly how do they fit into the Intentionality 
Table). One book he praises as definitive (Memory and the Computational Brain) presents the brain as a 
computational information processor—a sophomoric view thoroughly and repeatedly annihilated by S 
and others, including W in the 1930’s. In the last decade I have read thousands of pages by and about W 
and it is quite clear that C does not have a clue. In this he joins a long line of distinguished philosophers 
whose reading of W was fruitless—Russell, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam, Chomsky 
etc.(though Putnam began to see the light later). They just cannot grasp the message that most 
philosophy is grammatical jokes and impossible vignettes—a cartoon view of life. 
Books like ‘The Opacity of Mind’ that attempt to bridge two sciences or two levels of description are 
really two books and not one. There is the description (not explanation, as W made clear) of our 
language and nonverbal behavior and then the experiments of cognitive psychology. “The existence of 
the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; 
though problem and method pass one another by." (W  PI p232), C et al are enthralled by science and 
just assume that it is a great advance to wed high level descriptive psychology to neuroscience and 
experimental psychology, but W/S and many others have shown this is a mistake. Far from making the 
description of behavior scientific and clear, it makes it incoherent. And it must have been by the grace of 
God that Locke, Kant, Nietzsche, Hume, Wittgenstein, Searle et al were able to give such memorable 
accounts of behavior without any experimental science whatsoever. Of course like politicians, 
philosophers rarely admit mistakes or shut up, so this will go on and on for reasons W diagnosed 
perfectly. The bottom line has to be what is useful and what makes sense in our everyday life. I suggest 
the philosophical views of CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), as opposed to those of W/S, are not 
useful and their ultimate conclusions that will, self and consciousness are illusions make no sense at 
all—i.e., they are meaningless, having no clear COS. Whether the CDC comments on cognitive science 
have any heuristic value remains to be determined. 
This book (like a huge body of other writing) tries to discount the HOT of other animals and to reduce 
behavior to brain functions (to absorb psychology into physiology). The philosophy is a disaster but, 
provided one first reads the many criticisms in the BBS, the commentary on recent psychology and 
physiology may be of interest. Like Dennett, Churchland and so many others often do, C does not reveal 
his real gems til the end, when we are told that self, will, consciousness  are illusions (supposedly in the 
normal senses of this words). Dennett had to be unmasked by S, Hutto et al for explaining away these 
‘superstitions’ (i.e., doing the usual philosophical move of not explaining at all and in fact not even 
describing) but amazingly C admits it at the beginning, though of course he thinks he is showing us these 
words do not mean what we think and that his cartoon use is the valid one. 
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One should also see Bennett and Hacker’s criticisms of cognitive science in ‘ 
Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ (2003) and their debate with  S and Dennett in ‘Neuroscience 
and Philosophy’(2009-and don’t miss the final essay by Daniel Robinson.  It is also well explored in 
Hacker’s three recent books on "Human Nature".   
There have long been books on chemical physics and physical chemistry but there is no sign that the two 
will merge (nor is it a coherent idea) nor that chemistry will absorb biochemistry nor it in turn will 
absorb physiology or genetics, nor that biology will disappear nor that it will eliminate psychology, 
sociology, etc. This is not due to the ‘youth’ of these disciplines but to the fact that they are different 
levels of description with entirely different concepts, data and explanatory mechanisms. But physics 
envy is powerful and we just cannot resist the ‘precision’ of physics, math, information, and 
computation vs the vagueness of higher levels. It ‘must’ be possible. Reductionism thrives in spite of the 
incomprehensibility of quantum mechanics, uncertainty, wave/particles, live/dead cats, quantum 
entanglement, and the incompleteness and randomness of math (Godel/Chaitin—see my full review of 
Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’ and the excerpts here) and its irresistible pull tells us it is due to 
EP defaults. Again a breath of badly needed fresh air from W: “For the crystalline purity of logic was, of 
course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.” PI p107. It is hard to resist throwing down 
most books on behavior and rereading W and S. Just jump from anything to e.g. these quotes from PI 
http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94-138_239-309.html. 
 
It is clear to me after reading ten thousand pages of philosophy in the last decade that the attempt to 
do higher level descriptive psychology of this kind, where ordinary language morphs into special uses 
both deliberately and inadvertently, is essentially impossible (i.e., the normal situation in philosophy 
and other behavioral disciplines). Using special jargon words (e.g., intensionality, realism etc.) does not 
work either as there are no philosophy police to enforce a narrow definition and the arguments on 
what they mean are interminable. Hacker is good but his writing so precious and dense it’s often 
painful. Searle is very good but requires some effort to embrace his terminology and makes some 
egregious mistakes, while W is hands down the clearest and most insightful, once you grasp what he is 
doing, and nobody has ever been able to emulate him. His TLP remains the ultimate statement of the 
mechanical reductionist view of life, but he later saw his mistake and diagnosed and cured the ‘cartoon 
disease’, but few get the point and most simply ignore him and biology as well, and so there are tens of 
thousands of books and millions of articles and most religious and political organizations (and until 
recently most of economics) and almost all people with cartoon views of life.  But the world is not a 
cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoon views of life collide with reality and 
universal blindness and selfishness bring about the collapse of civilization. 
 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same 
reason as all basic behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of 
what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly 
remain oblivious. 
However, it is true that most of behavior is mechanical and that The Phenomenological Illusion is of 
vastly greater reach than Searle describes. It is most striking to me when driving a car on the freeway 
and suddenly snapping back to S2 awareness startled to realize I have just driven for several minutes 
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with no conscious awareness at all. On reflection, this automatism can be seen to account for almost all 
of our behavior with just minimal supervision and awareness from S2.  I am writing this page and have 
to think about what to say, but then it just flows out into my hands which type it and by and large it’s a 
surprise to me except when I think of changing a specific sentence. And you read it giving commands to 
your body to sit still and look at this part of the page but the words just flow into you and some kind of 
understanding and memory happen but unless you concentrate on a sentence there is only a vague 
sense of doing anything. A soccer player runs down the field and kicks the ball and thousands of nerve 
impulses and muscle contractions deftly coordinated with eye movements, and feedback from 
proprioceptive and balance organs have occurred, but there is only a vague feeling of control and high 
level awareness of the results. S2 is the Chief of Police who sits in his office while S1 has thousands of 
officers doing the actual work according to laws that he mostly does not even know. Reading, writing or 
soccer are voluntary acts A2 seen from above but composed of thousands of automatic acts A1 seen 
from below. Much of contemporary behavioral science is concerned with these automatisms.  
It is a good idea to read at least Chapter 6 of Searle’s PNC, “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI). It is 
clear as crystal that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow 
conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate blindness. It is 
also clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier and gave the reason for it in the primacy of the 
true-only unconscious automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1 which is the source of the 
Inner. Very roughly, regarding ‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 or The Inner, and 
‘observer dependent’ features as S2 or The Outer should prove very revealing. As Searle notes, the 
Phenomenologists have the ontology exactly backwards, but of course so does almost everyone due to 
the defaults of their EP. 
Another excellent work on W that deserves close study is Johnston’s ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ 
(1993).  He notes that some will object that if our reports and memories are really untestable they 
would have no value but “This objection misses the whole point of W’s argument, for it assumes that 
what actually happened, and what the individual says happened, are two distinct things. As we have 
seen, however, the grammar of psychological statements means that the latter constitutes the criteria 
for the former. If we see someone with a concentrated expression on her face and want to know ‘what 
is going on inside her’, then her sincerely telling us that she is trying to work out the answer to a 
complicated sum tells us exactly what we want to know. The question of whether, despite her sincerity, 
her statement might be an inaccurate description of what she is (or was) doing does not arise. The 
source of confusion here is the failure to recognize that psychological concepts have a different 
grammar from that of concepts used to describe outer events. What makes the inner seem so 
mysterious is the misguided attempt to understand one concept in terms of another. In fact our concept 
of the Inner, what we mean when we talk of ‘what was going on inside her’ is linked not to mysterious 
inner processes, but to the account which the individual offers of her experience…As processes or 
events, what goes on inside the individual is of no interest, or rather is of a purely medical or scientific 
interest” (p13-14). 
“W’s attack on the notion of inner processes does not imply that only the Outer matters, on the 
contrary; by bringing out the true nature of utterances, he underlines the fact that we aren’t just 
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interested in behavior. We don’t just want to know that the person’s body was in such and such a 
position and that her features arranged in such and such a way. Rather we are interested in her account 
of what lay behind this behavior…” (p16-17) 
In laying out W’s reasoning on the impossibility of private rules or a private language, he notes that “The 
real problem however is not simply that she fails to lay down rules, but that in principle she could not do 
so…The point is that without publicly checkable procedures, she could not distinguish between following 
the rule and merely thinking she is following the rule.” 
 
On p55 Johnston makes the point with respect to vision (which has been made many times by W and S 
in this and other contexts) that the discussion of the Outer is entirely dependent for its very 
intelligibility on the unchallengeable nature of our direct first person experience of the Inner. The 
System 2 sceptical doubts concerning mind, will, senses, world, cannot get a foothold without the 
true-only certainties of System 1 and the certainty that you are reading these words now is the basis 
for judgment, not a thing that can itself be judged.  This mistake is one of the most basic and common 
in all philosophy. 
On p81 he makes the point that the impossibility, in the normal case, of checking your statements 
concerning your dispositions (often but confusingly called ‘propositional attitudes’) such as what you 
thought or are feeling, far from being a defect of our psychology, is exactly what gives these 
statements interest. “I am tired” tells us how you are feeling rather than giving us another bit of data 
about the Outer such as your slow movements or the shadows under your eyes. 
Johnston then does an excellent job of explaining W’s debunking of the idea that meaning or 
understanding (and all dispositions) are experiences that accompany speech. As W pointed out, just 
consider the case where you think you understand, and then find out you did not, to see the irrelevance 
of any inner experience to meaning, understanding, thinking, believing, knowing etc. The experience 
which counts is the awareness of the public language game we participate in. Similar considerations 
dissolve the problem of the ‘lightning speed of thought’. “The key is to recognize that thinking is not a 
process or a succession of experiences but an aspect of the lives of conscious beings. What corresponds 
to the lightning speed of thought is the individual’s ability to explain at any point what she is doing or 
saying.” (p86). And as W says “Or, if one calls the beginning and the end of the sentence the beginning 
and end of the thought, then it is not clear whether one should say of the experience of thinking that it 
is uniform during this time or whether it is a process like speaking the sentence itself” (RPP2 p237). 
Again: “The individuals account of what she thought has the same grammar as her account of what she 
intended and of what she meant. What we are interested in is the account of the past she is inclined to 
give and the assumption that she will be able to give an account is part of what is involved in seeing her 
as conscious” (p 91). That is, all these disposition verbs are part of our conscious, voluntary S2 
psychology. 
In “The Complexity of the Inner”, he notes that it is ironic that our best way to communicate the Inner is 
to refer to the Outer but I would say it is both natural and unavoidable. Since there is no private 
language and no telepathy, we can only contract muscles and by far the most efficient and deep 
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communication is by contracting oral muscles (speech). As W commented in several contexts, it is in 
plays (or now in TV and films) that we see language (thought) in its purest form. 
Dispositions like intending continue as long as we don’t change or forget them and thus lack a precise 
duration as well as levels of intensity and the content is a decision and so is not a precise mental state, 
so in all these respects they are quite different from S1 perceptions, memories and reflexive responses 
like S1 emotions. 
The difference between S1 and S2 (as I put it- this was not a terminology available to J or W) also is seen 
in the asymmetry of the disposition verbs, with the first person use of ‘I believe’ etc., being (in the 
normal case of sincere utterance) true-only sentences vs the third person use ‘he believes’ etc., being 
true or false evidence-based propositions. One cannot say “I believe it is raining and it isn’t” but other 
tenses such as “I believed it was raining and it wasn’t” or the third person “He believes it is raining and it 
isn’t” are OK. As J says: “The general issue at the heart of the problem here is whether the individual can 
observe her own dispositions…The key to clarifying this paradox is to note that the individuals 
description of her own state of mind is also indirectly the description of a state of affairs…In other 
words, someone who says she believes P is thereby committed to asserting P itself…The reason therefor 
that the individual cannot observe her belief is that by adopting a neutral or evaluatory stance towards 
it, she undermines it. Someone who said “I believe it’s raining but it isn’t” would thereby undermine her 
own assertion. As W notes, there can be no first person equivalent of the third person use of the verb 
for the same reason that a verb meaning to believe falsely would lack a first person present 
indicative...the two propositions are not independent, for ‘the assertion that this is going on inside me 
asserts: this is going on outside me’ (RPP1 p490)” (p154-56). Though not commented on by W or J, the 
fact that children never make such mistakes as “I want the candy but I don’t believe I want it” etc., 
shows that such  constructions are built into our grammar(into our genes) and not cultural add-ons. 
He then looks at this from another viewpoint by citing W “What would be the point of my drawing 
conclusions from my own words to my behavior, when in any case I know what I believe? And what is 
the manifestation of my knowing what I believe? Is it not manifested precisely in this-that I do not infer 
my behaviour from my words? That is the fact.” (RPP1 p744). Another way to say this is that S1 is the 
axiomatic true-only basis for cognition, and as the non-propositional substrate for determining truth and 
falsity, cannot be intelligibly judged. 
He ends the chapter with important comments on the variability within the LG’s (within our psychology) 
and I suggest it be read carefully. 
Johnston continues the discussion in “The Inner/Outer Picture” much of which is summed up in his 
quote from 
W.  “The inner is hidden from us means that it is hidden from us in a sense that it is not hidden from 
him. And it is not hidden from the owner in the sense that he gives expression to it, and we, under 
certain conditions, believe his expression and there error has no place. And this asymmetry in the game 
is expressed in the sentence that the Inner is hidden from other people.” (LWPP2 p36). J goes on: “The 
problem is not that inner is hidden but that the language game it involves is very different from those 
where we normally talk about knowledge.”  And then he enters into one of W’s major themes 
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throughout his life—the difference between man and machine. “But with a human being the 
assumption is that it is impossible to gain an insight into the mechanism. Thus indeterminacy is 
postulated…I believe unpredictability must be an essential characteristic of the Inner. As also is the 
endless diversity of expressions.” (RPP2 p645 and LWPP2 p65). Again W probes the difference between 
animals and computers. 
J notes that the uncertainties in our LG’s are not defects but critical to our humanity. Again W: “[What 
matters is] not that the evidence makes the feeling (and so the Inner) merely probable, but that we treat 
this as evidence for something important, that we base a judgement on this involved sort of evidence, 
and so that such evidence has a special importance in our lives and is made prominent by a concept.” (Z 
p554). 
 
J sees three aspects of this uncertainty as the lack of fixed criteria or fine shades of meaning, the 
absence of rigid determination of the consequences of inner states and the lack of fixed relationships 
between our concepts and experience. W:”One can’t say what the essential observable consequences of 
an inner state are. When, for example, he really is pleased, what is then to be expected of him, and what 
not? There are of course such characteristic consequences, but they can’t be described in the same way 
as reactions which characterize the state of a physical object.” (LWPP2 p90). J “Here her inner state is 
not something we cannot know because we cannot penetrate the veil of the Outer. Rather there is 
nothing determinate to know.” (p195). 
In his final chapter he notes that our LG’s are not likely to change regardless of scientific progress. 
“Although it is conceivable that the study of brain activity might turn out to be a more reliable predictor 
of human behavior, the sort of understanding of human action it gave would not be the same as that 
involved in the language game on intentions. Whatever the value of the scientists discovery, it could not 
be said to have revealed what intentions really are.” (p213). 
This indeterminateness leads to the notion that correlation of brain states with dispositions seems 
unlikely. “The difficulty here is that the notion of one thought is a highly artificial concept. How many 
thoughts are there in the Tractatus? And when the basic idea for it struck W, was that one thought or a 
rash of them? The notion of intentions creates similar problems…These subsequent statements can all 
be seen as amplifications or explanations of the original thought, but how are we to suppose this relates 
to the brain state? Are we to imagine that it too will contain the answer to every possible question 
about the thought?..we would have to allow that two significantly different thoughts are correlated with 
the same brain state…words may in one sense be interchangeable and in another sense not. This creates 
problems for the attempt to correlate brain states and thoughts…two thoughts may be the same in one 
sense and different in another…Thus the notion of one thought is a fragile and artificial one and for that 
reason it is hard to see what sense it could make to talk of a one to one correlation with brain states.” 
(p218-219).  That is, the same thought (COS) “it’s raining” expresses an infinite number of brain states in 
one or many people. Likewise the ‘same’ brain state might express different thoughts (COS) in different 
contexts.  
 
Likewise, W denies that memory consists of traces in the nervous system. “Here the postulated trace is 
like the inner clock, for we no more infer what happened from a trace than we consult an inner clock to 
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guess the time.” He then notes an example from W (RPP1 p908) of a man jotting marks while he reads 
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and who cannot repeat the text without the marks but they don’t relate to the text by rules…”The text 
would not be stored up in the jottings. And why should it be stored up in our nervous system?” and also 
“…nothing seems more plausible to me than that people will some day come to the definite opinion that 
there is no copy in either the physiological or the nervous systems which corresponds to a particular 
thought or a particular idea of memory” (LWPP1 p504). This implies that there can be psychological 
regularities to which no physiological regularities correspond; and as W provocatively adds ‘If this upsets 
our concepts of causality, then it is high time they were upset.’” (RPP1 p905)…’Why should not the initial 
and the terminal states of a system be connected by a natural law which does not cover the 
intermediary state? (RPP1 p909)...[It is quite likely that] there is no process in the brain correlated with 
associating or with thinking, so that it would be impossible to read off thought processes from brain 
processes…Why should this order, so to speak, not proceed out of chaos?...as it were, causelessly; and 
there is no reason why this should not really hold for our thoughts, and hence for our talking and 
writing.’(RPP1 p903)…But must there be a physiological explanation here? Why don’t we just leave 
explaining alone?-but you would never talk like that if you were examining the behavior of a machine! – 
Well who says that a living creature, an animal body, is a machine in this sense?’”  (RPPI p918)(p 220- 
21). 
 
Of course one can take these comments variously, but one way is that W anticipates the rise of chaos 
theory, embodied mind and self organization in biology. Since uncertainty, chaos and unpredictability 
are standard doctrine now, from subatomic to molecular scale, and in planetary dynamics (weather 
etc.,) and cosmology, why should the brain be an exception? The only detailed comments on these 
remarks I have seen are in a recent paper by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS). 
 
It is quite striking that although W’s observations are fundamental to all study of behavior—linguistics, 
philosophy, psychology, history, anthropology, politics, sociology, and art, he is not even mentioned in 
most books and articles, with even the exceptions having little to say, and most of that distorted or flat 
wrong. There is a flurry of recent interest, at least in philosophy, and possibly this preposterous situation 
will change, but probably not much. 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes and the S2 reasons in 
Chapter 7 of Hacker’s recent book ‘Human Nature’ (2011), especially p226-32, is critical for any student 
of behavior. It is a nearly universal delusion that “cause” is a precise logically exact term while “reason” 
is not but W exposed this many times. Of course the same issue arises with all scientific and 
mathematical concepts. And of course one must keep constantly in mind that ‘action’, ‘condition’, 
‘satisfaction’, ‘intention’, and even ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘prior’, ‘true’ etc. are all complex language games able to 
trip us up as W so beautifully described in BBB in the early 30’s. 
 
Searle make many interesting remarks in one of his most recent books ‘Thinking About the Real World’ 
(TARW) (2013), and I seem to have written the only review, so I will discuss it in detail here. 
On p21 of TARW we again run into what I regard as the most glaring flaw in S’s work and one that 
should have been obviated long ago had he only read the later W and his commentators more 
carefully.  He refers to free will 
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as an “assumption” that we may have to give up! It is crystal clear from W that will, self, world, and all 
the phenomena of our lives are the basis for judging-the axiomatic bedrock of our behavior and there is 
no possibility of judging them. Can we “assume” we have two hands or live on the surface of the earth 
or that Madonna is a singer etc? Perhaps this huge mistake is connected with his blending of true only 
S1 and propositional S2 which I have noted. Amazing that he can get nearly everything else right and 
stumble on this! 
On p22 and elsewhere he uses the notion of unconscious intentionality, which he first discussed in his 
1991 paper in Phil. Issues, noting that these are the sorts of things that could become conscious (e.g., 
dreams). W was I think the first to comment on this noting that if you can’t speak of unconscious 
thoughts you can’t speak of conscious ones either (BBB). Here and throughout his work it is unfortunate 
that he does not use the S1,S2 concepts as it makes it so much easier to keep things straight and he still 
finds it necessary to indulge in very un-Wittgensteinian jargon. E.g., “Once you have manipulable 
syntactical elements, you can detach intentionality from its immediate causes in the form of perceptions 
and memories, in a way that it is not possible to make detachments of unsyntactically structured 
representational elements.” (p31) just says that with language came the dispositional intentionality of 
S2 where conscious thought and reason became possible. 
 
Regarding reasons and desires (p39) see elsewhere here and my reviews of his other works. 
 
S’s continued reference to dispositions as mental states and his reference to mental states as 
representations (actually ‘presentations’ here) with COS, is (in my view) counterproductive. On p25 e.g., 
it seems he wants to say that the apple we see is the COS of the CSR –(Causally Self Reflexive--i.e., cause 
is built in) perception of the apple and the reflexive unconscious scratching of an itch has the same 
status (i.e., a COS) as the deliberate planned movement of the arm. Thus the mental states of S1 are to 
be included with the actions of S2 as COS. Though I accept most of S’s ontology and epistemology I don’t 
see the advantage of this, but I have the greatest respect for him so I will work on it. I have noted his 
tendency (normal for others but a flaw in Searle) to mix S1 and S2 which he does on p29 where he 
seems to be referring to beliefs as mental states. It seems to me quite basic and clear since W’s BBB in 
the 30’s that S2 are not mental states in anything like the sense of S1. 
The paragraph beginning “Because” on p25 is discussing the true-only unconscious percepts, memories 
and reflexive acts of S1—i.e., our axiomatic EP. As noted, one can read Hutto and Myin’s book 
‘Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content’ (2012) for a very different recent account of the 
nonrepresentational or enactive nature of S1. 
 
The table of intentionality on p26 updates one he has used for decades and which I have used as the 
basis for my extended table above. 
Nearly half a century ago S wrote “How to derive ought from is” which was a revolutionary advance in 
our understanding of behavior. He has continued to develop the naturalistic description of behavior and 
on p39 he shows how ethics originates in our innate social behavior and language. A basic concept is the 
Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA) which is explained in his various books. For an outline see 
my reviews of his MSW and other works. He tends to use the proximate reasons of S2 (i.e., dispositional 
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psychology and culture) to frame his analysis but as with all behavior I regard it as superficial unless it 
includes the ultimate causes in S1 and so I break his DIRA into DIRA1 and DIRA2. This enables the 
description in terms of the unconscious mechanisms of reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness. Thus I 
would restate the last sentence on p39 “…people are asked to override their natural inclinations by 
making ethical considerations prevail” as “…people are compelled to override their immediate personal 
benefits to secure long term genetic benefits via reciprocal altruism and inclusive fitness.” 
S’s obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two systems framework and 
to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology as stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’, is most unfortunate (as I have noted in many reviews). It was W who did the first and best job 
of describing the two systems (though nobody else has noticed) and OC represents a major event in 
intellectual history. Not only is S unaware of the fact that his framework is a straightforward 
continuation of W, but everyone else is too, which accounts for the lack of any significant reference to 
W in this book. As usual one also notes no apparent acquaintance with EP, which can enlighten all 
discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate evolutionary and biological explanations rather 
than the superficial proximate cultural ones. 
Thus S’s discussion of the two ways to describe sensations (‘experiences’) on p202 is in my view vastly 
clearer if one realizes that seeing red or feeling pain is automatic true-only S1, but as soon as we attend 
to it consciously (ca. 500 msec or more) it becomes ‘seeing as’ and a propositional (true or false) S2 
function that can be expressed publicly in language (and other bodily muscle contractions as well). Thus 
the S1 ‘experience’ that is identical with red or the pain vs the S2 ‘experience’ of red or pain, once we 
begin to reflect on it, normally are blended together into one ‘experience’. For me by far the best place 
to get an understanding of these issues is still in W’s writings beginning with the BBB and ending with 
OC. Nobody else has ever described the subtleties of the language games with such clarity. One must 
keep constantly in mind the vagueness and multiple meanings of ‘mistake’, ‘true’, ‘experience’, 
‘understand’, ‘know’, ‘see’, ‘same’ etc., but only W was able to do it—even S stumbles frequently. And it 
is not a trivial issue—unless one can clearly restate all of p202 separating the true-only nonjudgeable S1 
from the propositional S2 then nothing about behavior can be said without confusion. And of course 
very often (i.e., normally) words are used without a clear meaning—one has to specify how ‘true’ or 
‘follows from’ or ‘see’  is to be used in this context and W is the only one I know of who consistently 
gets this right. 
Again on p203-206, the discussion of intrinsically intentional automatic causal dispositionality only 
makes sense to me because I look at it as just another way to describe S1 states which provide the raw 
material for deliberate conscious S2 dispositionality which, from a biological evolutionary point of view 
(and what other can there be?) has to be the case. Thus,his comment on p212 is right on the money— 
the ultimate explanation (or as W insists the description) can only be a naturalized one which describes 
how mind, will, self and intention work and cannot meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena. 
Recall S’s famous review of Dennett’s ‘Consciousness Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained 
away”. And this makes it all the more bizarre that S should repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure 
if we have free will and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). 
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Also I once again think S is on the wrong track (p214) when he suggests that the confusions are due to 
historical mistakes in philosophy such as dualism, idealism, materialism, epiphenomenalism etc., rather 
than in universal susceptibility to the defaults of our psychology—‘The Phenomenological Illusion’ (TPI) 
as he has termed it, and bewitchment by language as beautifully described by W.  As he notes, “The 
neurobiological processes and the mental phenomena are the same event, described at different levels” 
and “How can conscious intentions cause bodily movement?…How can the hammer move the nail in 
virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what solidity is causally…if you analyze what intention-in-action is 
causally, you see analogously there is no philosophical problem left over.” 
I would translate his comment (p220) “A speaker can use an expression to refer only if in the utterance 
of the referring expressions the speaker introduces a condition that the object referred to satisfies; and 
reference is achieved in virtue of the satisfaction of that condition.” as “Meaning is achieved by stating a 
publicly verifiable condition of satisfaction (truth condition).” “I think it is raining” is true if it is raining 
and false otherwise. 
Also I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, as commonly understood, 
presuppose a reality that exists independently of our representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world 
that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” 
Time for some more quotes and a discussion of his recent book of reprints ‘Philosophy in a New 
Century’(2008) and as elsewhere I will repeat some comments to place them in a different 
context.  
“Could a machine process cause a thought process? The answer is: yes. Indeed only a machine process 
can cause a thought process, and ‘computation’ does not name a machine process; it names a process 
that can be, and typically is, implemented on a machine.” Searle PNC p73 
“…the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of a physical system from 
outside; and the identification of the process as computational does not identify an intrinsic feature of 
the physics, it is essentially an observer relative characterization.” Searle PNC p95 
“The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. I am now making the 
separate and different point that syntax is not intrinsic to physics.” Searle PNC p94 
“The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive decomposition fails, because the 
only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the physics is to put a homunculus in the physics.” Searle PNC p97 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a pattern which 
it shares with its computational simulation, because the existence of the pattern does not explain how 
the system actually works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies 
no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal explanations of cognition… 
There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal 
levels of description.” Searle PNC p101-103 
“In short, the sense of ‘information processing’ that is used in cognitive science is at much too high a 
level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of intrinsic intentionality…We are blinded 
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to this difference by the fact that the same sentence ‘I see a car coming toward me,’ can be used to 
record both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of vision…in the sense 
of ‘information’ used in cognitive science, it is simply false to say that the brain is an information 
processing device.” Searle PNC p104-105 
“Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the nature of the 
fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and 
evaluations?...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s guillotine, the 
rigid fact-value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which already presupposes the falsity of the 
distinction.”   Searle PNC p165-171 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, are created 
by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations…the forms of the status function in question 
are almost invariably matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, 
requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action…these deontic structures make possible 
desire-independent reasons for action…The general point is very clear: the creation of the general field 
of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent 
reasons for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology 
because they have no immediate phenomenological reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness 
out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological 
illusion.” Searle PNC p115-117 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has no causal powers of its 
own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not 
lead to ontological reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it cannot be 
reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something that exists independently of 
experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of 
satisfaction.  And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, 
and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality is 
a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC p193 
 
Though S does not say and seems to be largely unaware, the bulk of his work follows directly from that 
of W, even though he often criticizes him. To say that Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it 
is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same 
reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior must be voicing 
some variant or extension of what W said (as they must if they are both giving correct descriptions of 
behavior). I find most of S foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room argument 
against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the Chinese 
Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's excellent, but virtually unknown, supplement 
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on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W's 
philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 ability of 
counting up to 3, as extended into the endless System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. 
W’s insights into the psychology of math provide an excellent entry into intentionality. I will also note 
that nobody who promotes Strong AI, the multifarious versions of behaviorism, computer functionalism, 
CTM (Computational Theory of Mind) and Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), seems to be aware that W's 
Tractatus can be viewed as the most striking and powerful statement of their viewpoint ever penned 
(i.e., behavior (thinking) as the logical processing of facts--i.e., information processing). Of course later 
(but before the digital computer was a gleam in Turing's eye) W described in great detail why these 
were incoherent descriptions of mind that must be replaced by psychology (or you can say this is all he 
did for the rest of his life). S however makes little reference to W’s prescient statement of mind as 
mechanism, and his destruction of it in his later work.  Since W, S has become the principal 
deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and perhaps the most important descriptive 
psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do 
others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S’s work is 
vastly easier to follow than W’s, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you 
approach it from the right direction.  See my articles for more details. 
 
Like W, Searle is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a 
rock and groundbreaking throughout. However his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to 
some mistakes and confusions. On p7 of PNC he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to 
the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but as Coliva, DMS et al have noted, W 
showed definitively in ‘On  Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic 
structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is the basis for judgment and 
cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of 
‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable 
certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of 
course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language” which W 
demonstrated over and over again. One word-- two (or many) distinct uses. 
On p10 he chastises W for his antipathy to theorizing but as I noted above, ‘theorizing’ is another 
language game (LG) and there is a vast gulf between a general description of behavior with few well 
worked out examples and one that emerges from a large number of such that is not subject to many 
counterexamples. Evolution in its early days was a theory with limited clear examples but soon became 
just a summary of a vast body of examples and a theory in a quite different sense. Likewise with a theory 
one might make as a summary of a thousand pages of W’s examples and one resulting from ten pages. 
Again on p12, ‘consciousness’ is the result of automated System 1 functioning that is ‘subjective’ in 
several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, a matter of evidence but a true-only 
understanding in our own case and a true-only perception in the case of others. 
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As I read p13 I thought: “Can I be feeling excruciating pain and go on as if nothing is wrong?” No!—this 
would not be ‘pain’ in the same sense. “The inner experience stands in need of outer criteria”(W) and 
Searle seems to miss this. See W or Johnston. 
As I read the next few pages I felt that W has a much better grasp of the mind/language connection, as 
he regards them as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as 
exemplified in numerous perspicuous examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now if it is not the 
causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." 
And as explained above I feel the questions with which S ends section 3 are largely answered by 
considering W’s OC from the standpoint of the two systems. Likewise for section 6 on the philosophy of 
science.  Rodych has done an article on Popper vs W which I thought superb at the time but I will have 
to reread it to make sure. Finally, on p25, one can deny that any revision of our concepts (language 
games) of causation or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read just about any page of W 
and much of DMS, Coliva, Hacker etc. for the reasons.  It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the 
world using examples from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything 
relevant to our normal use of words. 
On p31, 36 etc., we again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and life) of identical words 
glossing over the huge differences in LG’s of ‘belief’, ‘seeing’ etc., as applied to S1 which is composed of 
mental states in the present only, and S2 which is not. The rest of the chapter summarizes his work on 
‘social glue’ which, from an EP, Wittgensteinian perspective, is the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably and universally expanded during personal 
development into a wide array of automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, and 
arbitrarily into cultural variations on them. 
Chapters 3 to 5 contain his well-known arguments against the mechanical view of mind which seem to 
me definitive. I have read whole books of responses to them and I agree with S that they all miss the 
very simple logical (psychological) points he makes (and which, by and large, W made half a century 
earlier before there were computers). To put it in my terms, S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, 
physical, causal, automatic, non-propositional, true-only mental states, while slow S2 can only 
coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to 
behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). Computers and the rest of 
nature have only derived (ascribed) intentionality that is dependent on our perspective while higher 
animals have primary intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S and W appreciate, the 
great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical reductions of psychology masquerade as cutting 
edge science, but in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and 
cognitive psychology (freed of superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, 
Carruthers, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
Page 62 nicely summarizes one of his arguments but p63 shows that he has still not quite let go of the 
blank slate as he tries to explain trends in society in terms of the cultural extensions of S2. As he does in 
many other places in his writings, he gives cultural, historical reasons for behaviorism, but it seems quite 
obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all 
behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can 
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deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain 
oblivious.  As noted above, Searle has described this as TPI. Again on p65 I find W’s description of our 
axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in his OC and other works to be deeper than S’s (or 
anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ that dogs are conscious, but rather it is not open to doubt. See 
the earlier section of this article dealing with OC and DMS. 
Chapter 5 nicely demolishes CTM, LOT etc., noting that ‘computation’, ‘information’ , ‘syntax’, 
‘algorithm’, ‘logic’, ‘program’, etc., are observer relative (i.e., psychological) terms and have no physical 
or mathematical meaning(COS) in this psychological sense, but of course there are other senses they 
have been given recently as science has developed. Again, people are bewitched by the use of the same 
word into ignoring that vast difference in its use (meaning). These comments are all extensions of classic 
Wittgenstein and in this connection I recommend Hutto’s and Read’s papers too.
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Chapter 6 “The Phenomenological Illusion” (TPI) is by far my favorite, and, while demolishing that field, it 
shows both his supreme logical abilities and his failure to grasp the full power of both the later W, and 
the great heuristic value of recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal that TPI is 
due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only 
primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate blindness. It is clear that W showed this some 60 
years earlier and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic 
axiomatic network of our innate System 1. Like so many others, Searle dances all around it but never 
quite gets there. Very roughly, regarding ‘observer independent’ features of the world as S1 and 
‘observer dependent’ features as S2 should prove very revealing. As S notes, Heidegger and the others 
have the ontology exactly backwards, but of course so does almost everyone due to the defaults of their 
EP. 
But the really important thing is that S does not take the next step to realizing that TPI is not just a 
failing of a few philosophers, but a universal blindness to our EP that is itself built into EP. He actually 
states this in almost these words at one point, but if he really got it how could he fail to point out its 
immense implications for the world. With rare exceptions (e.g., the Jaina Tirthankaras going back over 
5000 years to the beginnings of the Indus civilization and most recently and remarkably Osho, Buddha, 
Jesus, Bodhidharma, Da Free John etc.), we are all meat puppets stumbling through life on our 
genetically programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our almost total preoccupation with using the 
second self S2 personality to indulge the infantile gratifications of S1 is creating Hell On Earth. As with all 
organisms, it’s only about reproduction and accumulating resources therefor. Yes, much noise about 
Global Warming and the imminent collapse of industrial civilization in the next century, but nothing is 
likely to stop it. S1 writes the play and S2 acts it out. Dick and Jane just want to play house—this is 
mommy and this is daddy and this and this and this is baby.  Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we 
are humans and not just another primate. 
Chapter 7 on the nature of the self is good but nothing really struck me as new. Chapter 8 on property 
dualism is much more interesting even though mostly a rehash of his previous work. The last of his 
opening quotes above sums this up, and of course the insistence on the critical nature of first person 
ontology is totally Wittgensteinian. The only big blunder I see is his blank slate or (cultural) type of 
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explanation on p 158 for the errors of dualism, when in my view it is clearly another instance of TPI—a 
mistake which he (and nearly everyone else) has made many times, and repeats on p177 etc., in the 
otherwise superb Chapter 9. The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the 
muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again he needs to read my comments or those of 
DMS on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason to believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of p172 
to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
 
A critical point is made again on p169. “Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions 
of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be produced, and second, that 
the utterance itself shall have conditions of satisfaction.” One way of regarding this is that the 
unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, 
bringing about throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, 
which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions 
in which only gross muscle movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions 
and S makes a similar point in Chapter 10.  The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings 
(contracts the muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story.  Again he needs to read my 
comments and those of DMS, Coliva, Andy Hamilton etc., on W’s OC so he changes the “good reason 
to believe” at the bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to “knows” (in the true-only sense). 
His last chapter “The Unity of the Proposition” (previously unpublished) would also benefit greatly from 
reading W’s “On Certainty” or DMS’s various books and papers, as they make clear the difference 
between true only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as 
a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 perceptions as propositional since they only become T or F after 
one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual 
or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre 
or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it “A proposition is anything at all that can determine a 
condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” Or, one 
needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case. 
Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from S’s 
half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally they 
should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated with W’s 
perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing 
exactly that. 
“So status functions are the glue that hold society together.  They are created by collective 
intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers…With the important exception of language 
itself, all of institutional reality and therefor in a sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts 
that have the logical form of Declarations…all of human institutional reality is created and maintained in 
existence by (representations that have the same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including 
the cases that are not speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations.”  Searle MSW p11-13 
“Beliefs, like statements, have the downward or mind (or word)-to-world direction of fit.  And desires 
and intentions, like orders and promises, have the upward or world-to-mind (or word) direction of fit. 
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Beliefs or perceptions, like statements, are supposed to represent how things are in the world, and in 
that sense they are supposed to fit the world; they have the mind-to-world direction of fit. The conative- 
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volitional states such as desires, prior intentions and intentions-in-action, like orders and promises, have 
the world-to-mind direction of fit. They are not supposed to represent how things are but how we 
would like them to be or how we intend to make them be…In addition to these two faculties, there is a 
third, imagination, in which the propositional content is not supposed to fit reality in the way that the 
propositional contents of cognition and volition are supposed to fit…the world-relating commitment is 
abandoned and we have a propositional content without any commitment that it represent with either 
direction of fit.” Searle MSW p15 
“Just as in intentional states we can make a distinction between the type of state …and the content of 
the state…so in the theory of language we can make a distinction between the type of speech act it 
is…and the propositional content…we have the same propositional content with different psychological 
mode in the case of the intentional states, and different illocutionary force or type in the case of the 
speech acts. Furthermore, just as my beliefs can be true or false and thus have the mind-to-world 
direction of fit, so my statements can be true or false and thus have the word-to-world direction of fit. 
And just as my desires or intentions cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or 
unsatisfied, so my orders and promises cannot be true or false but can be in various ways satisfied or 
unsatisfied—we can think of all the intentional states that have a whole propositional content and a 
direction of fit as representations of their conditions of satisfaction. A belief represents its truth 
conditions, a desire represents its fulfillment conditions, an intention represents its carrying out 
conditions…The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction…people erroneously suppose 
that every mental representation must be consciously thought…but the notion of a representation as I 
am using it is a functional and not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, 
that can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation 
of its conditions of satisfaction…we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena 
by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction.”  Searle MSW p28-32 
“The first four types of speech acts have exact analogues in intentional states: corresponding to 
Assertives are beliefs, corresponding to Directives are desires, corresponding to Commissives are 
intentions and corresponding to Expressives is the whole range of emotions and other intentional states 
where the Presup fit is taken for granted. But there is no prelinguistic analog for the Declarations. 
Prelinguistic intentional states cannot create facts in the world by representing those facts as already 
existing. This remarkable feat requires a language” MSW p69 
“Speaker meaning… is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. The 
capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive capacities. It requires the ability to think on 
two levels at once, in a way that is essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker 
intentionally produces a physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents something. 
And the same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level it is a physical object like any other. At 
another level it has a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs” MSW p74 
“…once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because there is no way you 
can make explicit speech acts performed according to the conventions of a language without creating 
commitments.  This is true not just for statements but for all speech acts” MSW p82 
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This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we can do is give 
descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories but of course “theory” and “description” 
are language games too and it seems to me S’s theory is usually W’s description—a rose by any other 
name…. W’s point was that by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all know to be true accounts 
of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language 
games), while S wants to generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own 
mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account for the multifarious 
language games they get closer and closer to describing behavior by way of numerous examples as did 
W. 
The Primary Language Games (PLG's)  are the simple automated utterances by our involuntary, System 
1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, non-propositional, mental states- our perceptions and 
memories and reflexive acts (‘will’) including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- 
and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger, which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later 
Secondary Language Games (SLG's) are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, 
loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, 
knowing, believing, etc.,    which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's a fact that attempts 
to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see 
W for many examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons (e.g., `I see that as an 
apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has 
demonstrated repeatedly it is meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make 
sense in the future--`Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never. 
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A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 
(e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) 
and Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). W 
recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical 
questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to 
recognize them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. 
The ideas here are already published and nothing will come as a surprise to those who have kept up 
with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is 
solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However his failure to take the later W seriously enough 
leads to some mistakes and confusions. In various places in his work (e.g., p7 of PNC) he twice notes that 
our certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but 
W showed definitively in ‘On Certainty’ that there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic 
structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment 
(reason) and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 of PNC he tells us that certainty is 
revisable, but this kind of ‘certainty’, which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our 
axiomatic and non-revisable certainty (Certainty1 of S1) via experience and is utterly different as it is 
propositional (true or false).  This is of course a classic example of the “battle against the bewitchment 
of our intelligence by language” which W demonstrated over and over again.  One word- two (or many) 
distinct uses. 
I feel that W has a better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards them as synonymous in 
many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as exemplified in numerous perspicacious 
examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are 
concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us."  One can deny that any revision of 
our concepts (language games) of causation or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read just 
about any page of W for the reasons. It’s one thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples 
from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything relevant to our normal use 
of words. 
 
The deontic structures or ‘social glue’ are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow 
dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal development into a wide array of 
automatic unconscious universal cultural deontic relationships with others (S3). Though this is my précis 
of behavior I expect it fairly describes S’s work. 
Those who wish to become acquainted with S’s well-known arguments against the mechanical view of 
mind, which seem to me definitive, may consult Chaps 3-5 of his PNC. I have read whole books of 
responses to them and I agree with S that they all miss the very simple logical (psychological) points he 
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makes (and which, by and large, W made half a century earlier). To put it in my terms, S1 is composed 
of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-propositional, true only mental states, while slow 
S2 can only coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). Computers 
and the rest of nature have only derived intentionality that is dependent on our perspective while 
higher animals have primary intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S and W appreciate, 
the great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical reductions of psychology masquerade as cutting 
edge science, but in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and 
cognitive psychology (freed of superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, 
Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. 
It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same 
reason as nearly all behavior—it is the default operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of 
what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly 
remain oblivious (TPI). I find W’s description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in 
his OC and other 3rd period works to be deeper than S’s (or anyone’s), and so we are NOT ‘confident’ 
that dogs are conscious, but rather it is not open to (not possible to) doubt. 
 
Now let us review Searle’s brilliant summary of his many years of work on the logical structure of the 
‘social glue’ that holds society together as set forth is his ‘Making the Social World’ (2010). 
A critical notion introduced by S many years ago is Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) on our thoughts 
(propositions of S2) which W called inclinations or dispositions to act--still called by the inappropriate 
term ‘propositional attitudes’ by many. COS are explained by S in many places such as on p169 of PNC: 
“Thus saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of 
satisfaction that the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have 
conditions of satisfaction.” As S states it in PNC, “A proposition is anything at all that can determine a 
condition of satisfaction…and a condition of satisfaction… is that such and such is the case.” Or, one 
needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case, as he makes clear 
in MSW. Regarding intentions, “In order to be satisfied, the intention itself must function causally in the 
production of the action.”(MSWp34). 
Most will benefit greatly from reading W’s “On Certainty” or “RPP1 and 2” or DMS’s two books on OC 
(see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true-only sentences describing S1 and true 
or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S’s taking S1 
perceptions as propositional (at least in some places in his work) since they can only become T or F 
(aspectual as S calls them here) after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point in PNC 
that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and 
fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. 
S often describes the critical need to note the various levels of description of one event so for IA 
(Intention in Action) “We have different levels of description where one level is constituted by the 
behavior at the lower level…in addition to the constitutive by way of relation, we also have the causal 
by means of relation.”(p37). 
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So, recognizing the S1 is only upwardly causal and contentless (lacking representations or information) 
while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (e.g., see Hutto and Myin’s ‘Radical Enactivism’) I would 
change the paragraphs from p39 beginning “In sum” and ending on pg 40 with “conditions of 
satisfaction” as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive intentions and actions (‘will’) are caused by the automatic 
functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to 
match how we desire things to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and 
imagination—desires time shifted and so decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional 
dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS 
in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true only reflexive S1. In language and perhaps in neurophysiology 
there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the 
causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike 
S1 which is always in the present. The two systems feed into each other and are often orchestrated by 
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the learned deontic cultural relations of S3 seamlessly, so that our normal experience is that we 
consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S 
has described as ‘The Phenomenological Illusion.’ 
He ends this amazing chapter by repeating for maybe the 10th time in his writings, what I regard as a 
very basic mistake that he shares with nearly everyone—the notion that the experience of ‘free will’ 
may be ‘illusory’. It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W’s 3rd period 
work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that ‘will’, ‘self’ and ‘consciousness’ are 
axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility 
(intelligibility) of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear 
numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. S understands and uses 
basically this same argument in other contexts (e.g., skepticism, solipsism) many times, so it is quite 
surprising he can’t see this analogy. He makes this mistake frequently when he says such things as that 
we have “good evidence” that our dog is a dog etc. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not 
evidential. Here you have the best descriptive psychologist since W so this is not a stupid mistake. 
 
His summary of deontics on p50 needs translation. Thus “You have to have a prelinguistic form of 
collective intentionality, on which the linguistic forms are built, and you have to have the collective 
intentionality of the conversation in order to make the commitment” is much clearer if supplemented 
with “The prelinguistic axiomatics of S1 underlie the linguistic dispositions of S2 (i.e., our EP) which 
evolve during our maturation into their cultural manifestations in S3.” 
Since status function declarations play a central role in deontics it is critical to understand them and so 
he explains the notion of ‘function’ that is relevant here. “A function is a cause that serves a purpose…In 
this sense functions are intentionality-relative and therefore mind dependent…status functions… 
require… collective imposition and recognition of a status”(p59). 
Again I suggest the translation of “The intentionality of language is created by the intrinsic, or mind- 
independent intentionality of human beings” (p66) as “The linguistic, conscious dispositionality of S2 is 
generated by the unconscious axiomatic reflexive functions of S1” (p68). That is, one must keep in mind 
that behavior is programmed by biology. 
However I strongly object to his statements on p66-67 and elsewhere in his writings that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As I have noted above, 
and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding 
behavior, that only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and 
Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 
were propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was 
philosophy before W would return and in fact life would not be possible (no this is not a joke). As W 
showed countless times and biology shows so clearly, life must be based on certainty—automated 
unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always have a doubt and pause to reflect will die. 
Contrary to his comments (p70) I cannot imagine a language lacking words for material objects any more 
than I can imagine a visual system that cannot see them, because it is the first and most basic task of 
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vision to segment the world into objects and so that of language to describe them. Likewise I cannot see 
any problem with objects being salient in the conscious field nor with sentences being segmented into 
words. How could it be otherwise for beings with our evolutionary history? 
On p72 and elsewhere, it will help to remember that expressions are the primitive reflexive PLG’s of S1 
while representations are the dispositional SLG’s of S2. 
Another translation from Philosophese into English is needed for the second paragraph on p79 
beginning ‘So far’ and ending ‘heard before’. “We convey meaning by speaking a public language 
composed of words in sentences with a syntax.” 
To his questions 4 and 5 on p105 as to the special nature of language and writing, I would answer: ’They 
are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth 
information transfer than contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of 
magnitude higher for visual information.’ 
On p106, a general answer to question 2 (How do we get away with it—i.e., why does it work) is EP and 
S1 and his statement that “My main strategy of exposition in this book is to try to make the familiar 
seem strange and striking” is of course classic Wittgenstein. His claim on the next page that there is no 
general answer to why people accept institutions is clearly wrong. They accept them for the same 
reason they do everything—their EP is the result of inclusive fitness. It facilitated survival and 
reproduction in the EEA (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation). Everything about us physically and 
mentally bottoms out in genetics. All the vague talk here (e.g., p114) about ‘extra-linguistic conventions’ 
and ‘extra semantical semantics’ is in fact referring to EP and especially to the unconscious automatisms 
of S1 which are the basis for all behavior. Yes, as W said many times, the most familiar is for that reason 
invisible. 
S’s suggestion (p115) that language is essential to games is surely mistaken. Totally illiterate deaf-mutes 
could play cards, soccer and even chess but of course a minimal counting ability would be necessary. I 
agree (p121) that the ability to pretend and imagine (e.g., the counterfactual or as-if notions involved in 
time and space shifting) are, in full form, uniquely human abilities and critical to higher order thought. 
But even here there are many animal precursors (as there must be), such as the posturing of ritual 
combats and mating dances, the decoration of mating sites by bower birds, the broken wing pretense of 
mother birds, fake alarm calls of monkeys, ‘cleaner’ fish that take a bite out of their prey and simulation 
of hawk and dove strategies (cheaters) in many animals. 
 
More translation is needed for his discussion of rationality (p126 et seq.). Saying that thinking is 
propositional and deals with true or false ‘factitive entities’ means that it is a typical S2 disposition which 
can be tested, as opposed to the true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. 
In ‘Free Will, Rationality and Institutional Facts’ he updates parts of his classic book ‘Rationality in 
Action’ and creates some new terminology for describing the formal apparatus of practical reasons 
which I do not find felicitous. “Factitive Entities’ do not seem different from dispositions and ‘motivator’ 
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(desire or obligation), ‘effector’ (body muscles), ‘constitutor’ (speech muscles) and ‘total reason’ (all 
relevant dispositions) do not, at least here seem to add to clarity (p126-132). 
We should do something here that rarely happens in discussions of human behavior and remind 
ourselves of its biology. Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often modified by the 
cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body 
and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and 
by changes in various neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. This may seem infelicitous as well, 
but has the virtue that it is based on fact, and given the complexity of our higher order thought, I don’t 
think a general description is going to get much simpler. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S ‘The 
Phenomenological Illusion’) is that S2 has generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are 
fully aware and in control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology knows this view is 
not credible. 
Thus I would translate his summary of practical reason on p127 as follows: “We yield to our desires 
(need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire –Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA— 
i.e., desires displaced in space and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions 
to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness 
(increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related).” 
Contrary to S’s comment on p128 I think if suitably defined, DIRA are universal in higher animals and not 
at all unique to humans (think mother hen defending her brood from a fox) if we include the automated 
prelinguistic reflexes of S1 (i.e., DIRA1), but certainly the higher order DIRA of S2 or DIRA2 that require 
language are uniquely human. This seems to me an alternative and clearer description of his 
“explanation” (as W suggested these are much better called ‘description’) on the bottom of p129 of the 
paradox of how we can voluntarily carry out DIRA2  (i.e., the S2 desires and their cultural extensions). 
That is, “The resolution of the paradox is that the recognition of desire-independent reasons can ground 
the desire and thus cause the desire, even though it is not logically inevitable that they do and not 
empirically universal that they do” can be translated as “The resolution of the paradox is that the 
unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often 
override the short term personal immediate desires.” Likewise for his discussion of this issue on p130-
31—it is EP, RA, IF, S1 (Evolutionary Psychology,, Reciprocal Altruism, Inclusive Fitness, System 1) which 
ground the dispositions and ensuing actions of S2. 
On p140 he asks why we can’t get deontics from biology but of course we must get them from biology 
as there is no other option and the above description shows how this happens. Contrary to his 
statement, the strongest inclinations DO always prevail (by definition, otherwise it is not the strongest), 
but deontics works because the innate programming of RA and IF override immediate personal short 
term desires. His confusion of nature and nurture, of S1 and S2, extends to conclusions 2 and 3 on p143. 
Agents do indeed create the proximate reasons of DIRA2, but these are not just anything but, with few 
if any exceptions, very restricted extensions of DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). If he really means to ascribe 
deontics to our conscious decisions alone then he is prey to ‘The Phenomenological Illusion’(TPI) which 
he so beautifully demolished in his classic paper of that name (see my review of PNC). As I have 
74  
noted above, there is a huge body of recent research exposing cognitive illusions which comprise our 
personality. TPI is not merely a harmless philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our biology 
which produces the illusion that we control our life and our society and the world and the consequences 
are almost certain collapse of industrial civilization during the next 150 years. 
He notes correctly that human rationality makes no sense without the ‘gap’ (actually 3 gaps which he 
has discussed many times). That is, without free will (i.e., choice) in some non-trivial sense it would all 
be pointless, and he has rightly noted that it is inconceivable that evolution could create and maintain 
an unnecessary genetically and energetically expensive charade.  But, like nearly everyone else, he 
cannot see his way out and so once again he suggests (p133) that choice may be an illusion. On the 
contrary, following W, it is quite clear that choice is part of our axiomatic S1 true-only reflexive actions 
and cannot be questioned without contradiction as S1 is the basis for questioning. You cannot doubt you 
are reading this page as your awareness of it is the basis for doubting. 
Now lets us briefly review Searle’s most recent book, ‘Seeing Things As They Are’ (STATA-2015). See the 
full review for further comments. 
 
As one expects from any philosophy, we are in deep trouble immediately, for on page 4 we have the terms 
‘perception’ and ‘object’ as though they were used is some normal sense but we are doing philosophy so 
we are going to be undulating back and forth between language games have no chance of keeping our day 
to day games distinct from the various philosophical ones.  Again you can read some of Bennett and 
Hacker’s ‘Neuroscience and Philosophy’ or ‘Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience’ to get a feel for 
this.  Sadly like nearly all philosophers, Searle (S) has still not adopted the two systems framework so it’s 
much harder to keep things straight than it needs to be. 
 
On p6, Believing and Asserting are part of system 2 which is linguistic, deliberative, slow, with no precise 
time of occurrence and ‘it is raining’ is their public Condition of Satisfaction (COS2) (Wittgenstein’s 
transitive) –i.e., it is propositional and representational and not a mental state and we can only intelligibly 
describe it in terms of reasons , while Visual Experience (VisExp) is system 1 and so requires (for 
intelligibility, for sanity)  that it be raining (it’s COS1) and has a determinate time of occurrence, is fast 
(typically under 500msec ), nontestable (Wittgenstein’s true-only), and nonpublic, automatic and not 
linguistic i.e., not propositional and presentational and only describable in terms of causes of a mental 
state. In spite of this on p7 after crushing the horrific (but still quite popular) term ‘propositional attitude’, 
he says that perception has propositional content, but I agree with W that S1 is true-only and hence 
cannot be propositional in anything like the sense of S2 where propositions are public statements (COS) 
that are true or false.  
 
On p12 keep in mind that he is describing the automaticity of System 1 (S1), and then he notes that to 
describe the world we can only repeat the description which W noted as showing the limits of language. 
The last sentence on to the end of the paragraph middle of p13 needs translating (like most of 
philosophy!) so for “The subjective experience has a content, which philosophers call an intentional 
content and the specification of the intentional content is the same as the description of the state of 
affairs that the intentional content presents you with etc.”  I would say ‘Perceptions are System 1 mental 
states that can only be described in the public language of System 2.”  And when he ends by noting again 
the equivalence of a description of believing with that of a description of our perception, he is repeating 
what W noted long ago and which is due to the fact that S1 is nonlinguistic and that describing, believing, 
knowing, expecting, etc. are all different psychological or intentional modes or language games played 
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with the same words.  
 
On p23 he refers to private ‘experiences’ but words are S2 and describe public events, so what warrants 
our use of the word for ‘private experiences’ (i.e., S1) can only be their public manifestations (S2) —i.e., 
language we all use to describe public acts as even for myself I cannot have any way to attach  language to 
something internal.  This is of course W’s argument against the possibility of a private language. He also 
mentions several times that hallucinations of X are the same as seeing X but what can be the test for this 
except that we are inclined to use the same words? In this case they are the same by definition so this 
argument rings hollow.   
 
On p35 top he again correctly attacks the use of ‘propositional attitude’ which is not an attitude to a 
sentence but an attitude (disposition) to its public COS, i.e., to the fact or truthmaker. Then he says “For 
example, if I see a man in front of me, the content is that there is a man in front of me. The object is the 
man himself. If I am having a corresponding hallucination, the perceptual experience has a content, but no 
object. The content can be exactly the same in the two cases, but the presence of a content does not imply 
the presence of an object.” The way I see this is that the ‘object’ is normally in the world and creates the 
mental state (S1) and if we put this in words it becomes S2 with COS2 (i.e., a public truthmaker) and this 
does entail the public object , but for an hallucination (or direct brain stimulation etc.) the ‘object’ is only 
the similar mental state resulting from brain activation.   
 
As W showed us, the big mistake is not about understanding perception but about understanding 
language—all the problems of philosophy proper are exactly the same—failure to look carefully at how the 
language works in a particular context so as to yield clear COS. 
Middle of p61 we see the confusions that arise here and everywhere when we fail to keep S1 and S2 
separate. Either we must not refer to representations in S1 or we must at least call them R1 and 
realize they have no public COS—i.e., no COS2.  
On p63 nondetachability only means that it is a caused automatic function of S1 and not a reasoned, 
voluntary function of S2. This discussion continues onto the next page, but of course is relevant to 
the whole book and to all of philosophy, and it is so unfortunate that Searle, and nearly all in the 
behavioral sciences, cannot get into the 21st century and use the two systems terminology which 
renders so many opaque issues very clear. Likewise with the failure to grasp that it’s always just a 
matter of whether it’s a scientific issue or a philosophical one and if philosophical then which 
language game is going to be played and what the COS are in the context in question. 
On p64 he says the ‘experience’ is in his head but that is just the issue—as W made so clear there is 
no private language and as Bennett and Hacker take the whole neuroscience community to task for, 
in normal use ‘experience’ can only be a public phenomenon for which we share criteria, but what is 
the test for my having an experience in my head?  At the least there is an ambiguity here which will 
lead to others. Many think these don’t matter, many think they do. Something happens in the brain 
but that’s a scientific neurophysiological issue and certainly by ‘experience’ or by ‘I saw a rabbit’ one 
never means the neurophysiology. Clearly this is not a matter for investigation but one of using 
words intelligibly.  
On p65 indexical, nondetachable, and presentational are just more philosophical jargon used instead 
of System 1 by people who have not adopted the two systems framework for describing behavior 
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(i.e., nearly everyone). Likewise for the following pages if we realize that ‘objects and states of 
affairs’, ‘visual experiences’, ‘fully determinate’ etc., are just language games where we have to 
decide what the COS are and that if we just keep in mind the properties of S1 and S2 all of this 
becomes quite clear and Searle and everyone else could stop ‘struggling to express’ it.  Thus (p69) 
‘reality is determinate’ only means that perceptions are S1 and so mental states, here and now, 
automatic, causal, untestable (true-only) etc. while beliefs, like all dispositions are S2 and so not 
mental states, do not have a definite time, have reasons and not causes, are testable with COS etc.  
On p70 he notes that intentions in action of perception (IA1 in my terms) are part of the reflexive 
acts of S1 (A1 in my terms) which may originate in S2 acts which have become reflexive (S2A in my 
terminology).  
On the bottom of p74 onto p75, 500 msec is often taken as the approximate dividing line between 
seeing (S1) and seeing as (S2) which means S1 passes the percept to higher cortical centers of S2 
where they can be deliberated upon and expressed in language.   
On p100-101 the ‘subjective visual field’ is S2 and ‘objective visual field’ is S1 and ‘nothing is seen’ in 
S2 means we don’t play the language game of seeing in the same sense as for S1 and indeed 
philosophy and a good chunk of science (e.g., physics) would be different if people realized they were 
playing language games and not doing science.   
On p107 ‘perception is transparent’ because language is S2 and S1 has no language as it’s automatic 
and reflexive so when saying what I saw or to describe what I saw I can only say “I saw a cat”.  Once 
again W pointed this out long ago as showing the limits of language.  
 
P110 middle needs to be translated from SearleSpeak into TwoSystemsSpeak so that “Because 
presentational visual intentionality is a subspecies of representation, and 
because all representation is under aspects, the visual presentations will always present their conditions of 
satisfaction under some aspects and not others.” becomes “Because the percepts of S1 present their data 
to S2, which has public COS, we can speak of S1 as though it also has public COS”.  On p111 the ‘condition’ 
refers to the public COS of S2, i.e., the events which make the statement true or false and ‘lower order’ 
and ‘higher order’ refer to S1 and S2. 
 
On p112 the basic action and basic perception are isomorphic because S1 feeds its data to S2, which can 
only generate actions by feeding back to S1 to contract muscles, and lower level perception and higher 
level perception can only be described in the same terms due to there being only one language to describe 
S1 and S2. On p117 bottom it would be much less mysterious if he would adopt the two systems 
framework so that instead of “internal connection” with conditions of satisfaction (my COS1), a perception 
would just be noted as the automaticity of S1 which causes a mental state.   
On p120 the point is that ‘causal chains’ have no explanatory power because  the language games of  
‘cause’ only make sense in S1 or other non-psychological phenomena of nature, whereas semantics is 
S2 and we can only intelligibly speak of reasons for higher order human behavior. One way this 
manifests is ‘meaning is not in the head’ which enmeshes us in other language games.  
On p121 to say it’s essential to a perception  (S1) that it has COS1 (‘the experience’) merely describes 
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the conditions of the language game of perception—it is an automatic causal mental state.  
 
On p 122 I think “First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective world is for it to be capable of 
causing ontologically subjective visual experiences like this.” is not coherent as there is nothing to which 
we can refer ‘this’ so it should be stated as “ First, for something to be red is just for it to incline me to call 
it ‘red’ ”—as usual, the jargon does not help at all and the rest of the paragraph is unnecessary as well.  
 
On p123 the ‘background disposition” is the automatic, causal, mental state of S1 and as I, in agreement 
with W, DMS and others have said many times these cannot intelligibly be called ‘presuppositions’ as they 
are unconsciously activated ‘hinges’ that are the basis for presuppositions.  
 
Section VII and VIII (or the whole book or most of higher order behavior or most of philosophy in the 
narrow sense  ) could be titled “The language games describing the interaction of the causal, automatic, 
nonlinguistic  transient mental states of S1 with the reasoned, conscious, persistent linguistic thinking of 
S2” and the background is not suppositional nor can it be taken for granted but it is our axiomatic true-
only psychology (the ‘hinges” or ‘ways of acting’  of W’s ‘On Certainty’) that underlie all suppositions. As is 
evident from my comments I think the whole section, lacking the two systems framework and W’s insights 
in OC is confused in supposing it presents an “explanation” of perception where it can at best only describe 
how the language of perception works in various contexts. We can only describe how the word ‘red’ is 
used and that’s the end of it and for the last sentence of this section we might say that for something to be 
a ‘red apple’ is only for it to normally result in the same words being used by everyone.  
 
Speaking of hinges, it is sad and a bit strange that Searle has not incorporated what many (e.g., DMS an 
eminent contemporary philosopher and leading W expert) regard as maybe the greatest discovery in 
modern philosophy—W’s revolutionizing of epistemology in his ‘On Certainty’ as nobody can do 
philosophy or psychology in the old way anymore without looking antiquated. And though Searle almost 
entirely ignored ‘On Certainty’ his whole career, in 2009 (i.e., 6 years before publication of this book) he 
spoke at a symposium on it held by the British Wittgenstein Society and hosted by DMS, so he is certainly 
aware of the view that has revolutionized the very topics he is discussing here. I don’t think this meeting 
was published, but his lecture can be downloaded from Vimeo. It seems to be a case of an old dog who 
can’t learn new tricks. Though he has probably pioneered more new territory in the descriptive psychology 
of higher order behavior than anyone since Wittgenstein, once he has learned a path he tends to stay on it, 
as we all do. Like everyone, he uses the French word repertoire when there is an easier to pronounce and 
spell English word ‘repertory’ and the awkward ‘he/she’ or reverse sexist ‘she’ when one can always use 
‘they’ or ‘them’. In spite of their higher intelligence and education, academics are sheep too.   
 
Section IX to the end of the chapter shows again the very opaque and awkward language games one is 
forced into when trying to describe (not explain as W made clear) the properties of S1 (i.e., to play the 
language games used to describe ’primary qualities’) and how these feed data into S2 (i.e., secondary 
qualities’), which then has to feed back to S1 to generate actions. It also shows the errors one commits by 
failing to grasp Wittgenstein’s unique view of ‘hinge epistemology’ presented in “On Certainty”. To show 
how much clearer this is with the dual system terminology I would have to rewrite the whole chapter (and 
much of the book). Since I have rewritten sections here several times, and often in my reviews of Searle’s 
other books, I will only give a couple brief examples.  
 
The sentence on p129 “Reality is not dependent on experience, but conversely. The concept of the reality 
in question already involves the causal capacity to produce certain sorts of experiences. So the reason that 
these experiences present red objects is that the very fact of being a red object involves a capacity to 
produce this sort of experience. Being a straight line involves the capacity to produce this other sort of 
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experience. The upshot is that organisms cannot have these experiences without it seeming to them that 
they are seeing a red object or a straight line, and that “seeming to them” marks the intrinsic intentionality 
of the perceptual experience.” Can be rendered as “S1 provides the input for S2 and the way we use the 
word ‘red’ mandates it’s COS in each context, so using these words in a particular way is what it means to 
see red. In the normal case, it does not ‘seem’ to us that we see red, we just see red and we use ‘seem to” 
to describe cases where we are in doubt.”  
 
On p130 “Our question now is: Is there an essential connection between the character of things in the 
world and the character of our experience?” can be translated as “Are our public language games (S2) 
useful (consistent) in the description of perception (S1)?” 
 
The first paragraph of Section X ‘The Backward Road’ is perhaps the most important one in the book, as it 
is critical for all of philosophy to understand that there cannot be a precise 1:1 connection between or 
reduction of S2 to S1 due to the many ways of describing in language a given event (mental state, i.e., 
percept, memory etc.). Hence the apparent impossibility of capturing behavior in algorithms (the 
hopelessness of ‘strong AI’) or of extrapolating from a given neuronal pattern in the brain to the 
multitudinous acts (language games) we use to describe it. The ‘Backward Road’ is the language (COS) of 
S2 used to describe S1.  Again I think his failure to use the two systems framework renders this quite 
confusing if not opaque. Of course he shares this failing with nearly everyone. Searle has commented on 
this before and so have others (e.g., Hacker) but it seems to have escaped most philosophers and almost 
all scientists.   
 
Again Searle misses the point in Sect XI and X12 –we do not and cannot ‘seem to see’ red or ‘seem’ to have 
a memory or ‘assume’ a relation between the experience and the word, but as with all the perceptions and 
memories that constitute the innate axiomatic true-only mental states of System 1, we just have the 
experience and “it” only becomes ‘red’ etc., when described in public language with this word in this 
context by System 2.  We know it’s red as this is a hinge—an axiom of our psychology that is our automatic 
action and is the basis for assumptions or judgements or presuppositions and cannot intelligibly be judged, 
tested or altered. As W pointed out so many times, a mistake in S1 is of an entirely different kind than one 
in S2. No explanations are possible—we can only describe how it works and so there is no possibility of 
getting a nontrivial “explanation” of our psychology.  As he always has, Searle makes the common and fatal 
mistake of thinking he understands behavior (language) better than Wittgenstein. After a decade reading 
W, S and many others I find that W’s ‘perspicuous examples’ , aphorisms and trialogues usually provide 
greater illumination than the wordy disquisitions of anyone else.  
 
 “We may not advance any kind of theory, There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. 
We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take it’s place.” (PI 109).  
 
On p135, one way to describe perception is that the event or object causes a pattern of neuronal 
activation (mental state) whose self-reflexive COS1 is that we see a red rose in front of us, and in 
appropriate contexts for a normal English speaking person, this leads us to activate muscle contractions 
which produces the words ‘I see a red rose’ whose COS2 is that there is a red rose there. Or simply, S1 
produces S2 in appropriate contexts. So on p136 we can say S1 leads to S2 which we express in this context 
by the word ‘smooth’ which describes (but never ‘explains’) how the language game of ‘smooth’ works in 
this context and we can translate “For basic actions and basic perceptions the intentional content is 
internally related to the conditions of satisfaction, even though it is characterized non-intentionalistically, 
because being the feature F perceived consists in the ability to cause experiences of that type. And in the 
case of action, experiences of that type consists in their ability to cause that sort of bodily movement.” as 
“Basic perceptions (S1) can lead automatically (internally) to basic reflex actions (A1) (i.e., burning a finger 
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leads to withdrawing the arm) which only then enters awareness so that it can be reflected upon and 
described in language (S2).  
 
On p150, the point is that inferring, like knowing, judging, thinking, is an S2 disposition expressed in 
language with public COS that are informational (true or false) while percepts are non-informational (see 
my review of Hutto and Myin’s book) automated responses of S1 and there is no meaningful way to play a 
language game of inferring in S1. Trees and everything we see is S1 for a few hundred msec or so and then 
normally enter S2 where they get language attached (aspectual shape or seeing as). 
 
Regarding p151 et seq., it is sad that Searle, as part of his lack of attention to the later W, never seems to 
refer to what is probably the most penetrating analysis of color words in W’s “Remarks on Colour’, which is 
missing from nearly every discussion of the subject I have seen. The only issue is how do we play the game 
with color words and with ‘same’, ‘different’, ‘experience ‘etc. in this public linguistic context (true or false 
statements—COS2) because there is no language and no meaning in a private one (S1). So it does not 
matter (except to neuroscientists) what happens in the mental states of S1 but only what we say about 
them when they enter S2. It’s clear as day that all 7.6 billion on earth have a slightly different pattern of 
neural activation every time they see red and that there is no possibility for a perfect correlation between 
S1 and S2. As I noted above it is absolutely critical for every philosopher and scientist to get this clear. 
 
Regarding the brain in a vat (p157), insofar as we disrupt or eliminate the normal relations of S1 and S2, we 
lose the language games of intentionality. The same applies to intelligent machines and W described this 
situation definitively over 80 years ago. 
 
"Only of a living being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has 
sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” (PI 281) 
 
Chapter 6: yes disjunctivism (like nearly all philosophical theses) is incoherent and the fact that this and 
other absurdities flourish in his own department and even among some of his former students who got top 
marks in his Philosophy of Mind classes shows perhaps that, like most, he stopped too soon in his 
Wittgenstein studies.  
 
On p188, yes veridical seeing and ‘knowing’ (i.e., K1) are the same since S1 is true-only- i.e., it is the fast, 
axiomatic, causally self-reflexive, automatic mental states which can only be described with the slow, 
deliberative public language games of S2.  
 
On p204 -5, representation is always under an aspect since, like thinking, knowing etc., it is a disposition of 
S2 with public COS, which is infinitely variable. 
 
Once again I think the use of the two systems framework greatly simplifies the discussion. If one insists to 
use ‘representation’ for ‘presentations’ of S1 then one should say that R1 have COS1 which are transient 
neurophysiological mental states, and so totally different from R2, which have COS2 (aspectual shapes) 
that are public, linguistically expressible states of affairs, and the notion of unconscious mental states is 
illegitimate since such language games lack any clear sense.  
 
Sadly, on p211 Searle for maybe the tenth time in his writings (and endlessly in his lectures) says that ‘free 
will’ may be illusory, but as W from the 30’s on noted, one cannot coherently deny or judge the ‘hinges’ 
such as our having choice, nor that we see, hear, sleep, have hands etc., as these words express the true-
only axioms of our psychology, our automatic behaviors that are the basis for action 
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On p219 bottom and 222 top—it was W in his work, culminating in ‘On Certainty’ who pointed out that 
behavior cannot have an evidentiary basis and that its foundation is our animal certainty or way of 
behaving that is the basis of doubt and certainty and cannot be doubted (the hinges of S1). He also noted 
many times that a ‘mistake’ in our basic perceptions (S1) which has no public COS and cannot be tested 
(unlike those of S2), if it is major or persists, leads not to further testing but to insanity.  
 
Phenomenalism p227 top:  See my extensive comments on Searle’s excellent essay ‘The Phenomenological 
Illusion’ in my review of ‘Philosophy in a New Century’. There is not even any warrant for referring to one’s 
private experiences as ‘phenomena’, ‘seeing’ or anything else. As W famously showed us, language can 
only be a public testable activity (no private language).  And on p230 the problem is not that the ‘theory’ 
‘seems’ to be inadequate, but that (like most if not all philosophical theories) it is incoherent.  It uses 
language that has no clear COS. As W insisted all we can do is describe—it is the scientists who can make 
theories.  
 
The bottom line is that this is classic Searle—superb and probably at least as good as anyone else can 
produce, but lacking understanding of the fundamental insights of the later Wittgenstein, and with no 
grasp of the two systems of thought framework, which could have made it brilliant.   
Finally, permit me to again note that W posed an interesting resolution to some of these ‘puzzles’ by 
suggesting that some ‘mental phenomena’ (i.e., words for dispositions leading to public acts) may 
originate in chaotic processes in the brain and that there is not anything corresponding to a memory 
trace nor to a single brain process identifiable as a single intention or action--that the causal chain ends 
without a trace, and that ‘cause’, ‘event’ and ‘time’ cease to be applicable (useful—having clear COS). 
Subsequently, many have made similar suggestions based on physics and the sciences of complexity and 
chaos. 
